Occupation and military intervention expose human security to violence on three levels—institutional, structural, and material.\(^1\) In institutional terms, they violate international law, which prohibits the use of force in international relations except in self-defence; they abrogate the laws of the occupied country; and they interfere in the establishment of government in a manner that serves the occupier rather than the occupied. Structurally, they introduce new conditions for the distribution of wealth and power, which cause more divisions among the population. In material terms, occupation and military intervention are imposed by force, which leads to resistance by force, and to heavy casualties among occupied and occupier alike. They also freeze economic activity, livelihoods and essential freedoms. Through their exponential effects, occupation and military intervention contravene basic human rights, create systemic human insecurity and set back human development. This is the lesson of history and it applies to all occupations and military interventions, whether in the Arab region or abroad.

At the time of writing, there are three cases of occupation and military intervention in the Arab region: the Occupied Palestinian Territory (the West Bank and Gaza strip since June 1967), Iraq (since April 2003), and Somalia (since December 2006). This chapter examines the origins of occupation and military intervention in these different cases and their compound costs and impacts. It starts by noting that the general impacts extend beyond the institutional, structural and material violence inflicted in those three cases. Occupation and military intervention undercut human security in neighbouring and other Arab countries in several ways. First, they displace peoples across borders, creating humanitarian challenges for neighbouring states and seeding tensions among them. Second, as a *cause célèbre* of extremist groups that resort to violence, they feed the militant appeal of those who continue the cycle of violence in the region and whose acts provoke a backlash against citizens’ rights and freedoms. Finally, as a threat to sovereignty, they allow Arab governments to cite national security as a pretext for halting or postponing democratization and for perpetuating authoritarian rule.

**Origins and rationales**

**Occupied Palestinian Territory:** In June 1967, Israel occupied territories in Egypt (Sinai)\(^2\) and Syria (Golan Heights),\(^3\) as well as the West Bank and Gaza that had been respectively under Jordanian and Egyptian rule since 1948. Successive Israeli governments have claimed that they are ready
public resentment of the military presence in its midst. In November 2008, the United States and Iraq signed an agreement by which the American forces will depart from Iraq by 31st December 2011. In his statement on the 27th of February 2009, the US President announced that by August 31, 2010, the "combat mission in Iraq will end".

Somalia: The country has come under two forms of military intervention since the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991. The declared reason for the first intervention by US forces in 1992 was the rescue of hundreds of thousands of famine-stricken Somalis, victims of the outbreak of war between two camps in the United Somali Congress. American forces departed the following year, after their original mission of guaranteeing the delivery of emergency food relief evolved into a military mission to restore order that brought them into a violent confrontation with the forces of Mohamed Farah Aidid (Salah Al-Nasrawi, background paper for the report).

The second military intervention in Somalia occurred in December 2006 when Ethiopian forces intervened to defend the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the forces of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The latter had succeeded in extending its control over portions of Somalia, especially in the south, and over the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces claimed to have entered the country in response to an appeal by the TFG, stating that their presence was a temporary measure to deter ICU’s threats to Ethiopia’s national security. In addition, two militant movements opposed to the Ethiopian government are operating from inside Somalia and receive support from Eritrea. Shortly after Ethiopia’s entrance into Somalia, the African Union sent a peacekeeping force pursuant to UNSC resolution 1744, in February 2007. In December 2008, Ethiopia declared that it would withdraw its forces from Somalia, after having "undertaken numerous activities in the interest of the peace and stability of Somalia".

In all three cases, occupation and military intervention violate international law, the authoritative frame of reference for regulating relations between nations.
and peoples. International law prohibits the occupation of others’ land by force or recourse to military force against another nation for purposes other than self-defence. A further common feature of military intervention in these countries is that it has deepened existing class, group, sectarian or tribal divisions, aggravating tensions that have erupted into conflicts within conflicts.

The compound impacts of military intervention on human security

I. Threats to Life

A. Iraq

In Iraq, threats to life are associated with widespread insecurity. The immediate causes of the decline in public security following the US-led invasion are to be found in the military intervention per se. This intervention polarized the country. Among the general public, especially in central and southern Iraq, the restrictions brought about by the military invasion were widely resented. In addition, the short-sighted decrees of the first provisional governor of Iraq, which dissolved the army and police force, abolished the Baath Party, banned its members from government and dismantled key government agencies, effectively swept away the very institutions that might have safeguarded public security under such conditions. These decisions also assured the enmity of those who lost their jobs and incomes as a result.

In this environment, the country witnessed fierce fighting in which many forces took part for different motives, and which claimed enormous casualties. In conditions of increasing chaos, the US-led multinational coalition (the number of the American forces varied between 250,000 troops in 2003 and 143,000 troops in September 200811 and the number of UK troops varied between 18,000 troops in May 2003 and 4,100 troops in May 2008)12 was unable to discharge its obligations to ensure the security of Iraqi citizens, many of whom disbelieved in the legitimacy, authority and mission of the foreign forces in their midst. Other parties caught in this conflict were the private security companies, brought in to offset the lack of sufficient US forces and to perform vital security and support functions. Figures on the numbers of private security contractors in the country have often been conflicting. In mid-2006, the US Federal Accounting Bureau estimated that 181 of these firms had been operating in Iraq, with a total of 48,000 personnel.13

The Iraqi militias represent a third party to the chaos in the country. Among these are several armed groups formed by Baathists, Sunni Islamic movements, and al-Qaeda members who infiltrated Iraq with the pretext of resisting the US military presence. A significant development has been the creation of the so-called Sahwa (Awakening) Councils which the US forces persuaded many Sunni tribal chiefs to establish in 2007 in order to fight al-Qaeda members active in Iraq. There are also Shiite militias foremost among which are the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. In addition, there are the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which perform security missions in Kurdistan. Some estimates put the number of such militias at thirty five14 and others at seventy four,15 although there are no reliable sources on this. The spread of weapons and power to these militias, each a potential fiefdom of its own, raises questions about their integration into any unified state in the future.

Box 8.1 The special case of Lebanon

In the Arab region, Lebanon is a marked instance of acute vulnerability to intervention from outside. Several times the victim of Israeli occupation, it has also experienced the temporary presence of Western forces—the US Forces in 1958, and the Americans, French, Italians and British forces in 1982—as well as the presence of Syrian forces, at the invitation of the Lebanese Government in 1976, which continued to March 2005. Israel has occupied parts of Lebanon several times, most forcibly in 1982 in the context of its confrontation with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). In their 1982 campaign, Israeli forces reached Beirut, but then withdrew to southern Lebanon. Although Israel evacuated the area in 2000, its aerial assaults and armed incursions continued sporadically afterwards. The last Israeli massive offensive against Lebanon, which lasted 33 days, took place in the summer of 2006 after Hezbollah crossed the Blue Line separating the two countries, killing three Israeli soldiers and seizing two more. The tug-of-war between external powers over Lebanon’s domestic affairs has at times paralyzed its government and disrupted both the security of the nation and that of its people.

Military intervention has deepened existing class, group, sectarian or tribal divisions.

Iraq witnessed fierce fighting in which many forces took part and which claimed enormous casualties.

Source: The Report team
The proliferation of militias has been encouraged by two major factors: the security and political vacuum in the country, and the ethnically based selection processes of the foreign forces, which have driven forces fighting over power and wealth in Iraq to bolster their autonomy in order to obtain what they consider their rightful share of both. Moreover, not only have the militias taken control of public life, they have also seized sources of national wealth, such as petroleum, which they smuggle out in order to finance their activities.

This lawless situation has had two especially damaging consequences. The first is the deepening of sectarian entrenchment as people clamour for protection from hostile sects, and the consequent rise in levels of violence. The second is the disappearance from public life of that broad segment of Iraqis whose capacity for political organisation and peaceful action in support of the idea of a whole nation has been paralyzed by violence and terrorism (Salah Al-Nasrawi, in Arabic, background paper for the report). Indeed, in the absence of a general consensus over how to handle the military invasion, the concept of resistance itself has become distorted and tangled. It often reflects confusion between a national stance that prioritises the struggle to regain independence, and the narrow defence of the particular interests of national groups.

The victims of violence have been as diverse as the forms of violence inflicted on them. The greatest numbers are found among the Iraqi people, of all faiths, creeds and ethnicities, who have borne the brunt of the situation. But the casualties include foreign civilians working in Iraq, whether for the UN, or for Arab and other foreign embassies, or for private organizations. They also include prominent political and security officials in the Iraqi government. The most vulnerable sectors of the local population have been the small religious minorities, notably Chaldeans, Assyrian Christians, Yazidis, and Sabaeans. These communities have been the victims of frequent attacks by car and suicide bombers aimed at forcing them out of the country (Salah Al-Nasrawi, in Arabic, background paper for the report). After several years of the US-led invasion, the evidence of sectarian polarization is everywhere today in Iraq, with sects barricaded in their neighbourhoods against attack from others and with one sect’s members denying or disguising their identities when obliged to pass through another’s enclave.

Estimates of mortalities among Iraqis from March 2003 to June 2006 vary considerably. While Iraq Body Count\(^\text{16}\) (IBC), which gathers its information from the daily press, lists 47,668 violent deaths in the country since the beginning of the invasion, a field study\(^\text{17}\) conducted by Burnham et al. that relied on 1,849 families divided into forty-seven sample segments arrived at a figure of 601,027 deaths due to violence. The Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS),\(^\text{18}\) a larger and more recent national household survey by the Iraqi government and the World Health Organization (WHO) that took a sample of 9,345 families between 2006 and 2007, placed the number of violent deaths at 151,000. Figures 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3 illustrate the diverse reckonings of the three surveys.

Whatever source is consulted, it is evident that mortalities, whether caused by deteriorating health conditions or violence, soared after the invasion. Based on IFHS results, the mortality rate, in general, nearly doubled from 3.17 per 1,000 inhabitants before the invasion to 6.01 per 1,000 afterwards. The number of violent deaths increased ten times, climbing from 0.1 per 1,000 to 1.09 per 1,000 after the invasion. Kurdistan is the only province to experience a decline in the mortality rate, which dropped slightly from 3.7 per 1,000 to 3.68 per 1,000 after the invasion. Also,
deaths by violence—around 0.07 per 1,000 after the invasion—have been less common there than in other Iraqi provinces. The reason for Kurdistan’s unique situation is fairly clear: it has been effectively autonomous from the central government in Baghdad since being declared a no-flight zone for Iraqi aircraft more than eleven years before the invasion.

In the case of foreign forces, since the start of the campaign in March 2003, a total of 4,212 US soldiers had died by 3 January 2009, and a total of 178 British Armed Forces personnel or Ministry of Defence civilians had died by 12 December 2008. Among the Iraqi security forces the death rate was considerably higher. According to a US Congress report, the estimate of total Iraqi Security Forces and Police deaths, between June 2003 and November 2006 was 5,736, whereas the total US forces killed in the same period came to 2,196.

From February 2007, however, the situation gradually began to improve for both Iraqi civilians and troops. According to the icasualties.org website, civilian casualties declined from 1,598 in August 2007 to less than 1,000 in September and October that year, and to less than 500 per month after that. In February 2008, the civilian toll was 443. Among Iraqi forces, in August 2007, the number of war victims dropped to less than 100 from 232 the previous month. Apart from October 2007, the monthly rate has remained lower than 100 since then. In February 2008, the toll among Iraqi forces was eighty. US forces experienced a similar decline in fatalities, to less than 100 between July and September 2007, and to fewer than fifty since October that year. By March 2008, the total US death toll in Iraq had reached 4,000.

In all events, the toll of violence in Iraq began to fall after September 2007. The most important factors contributing to this development were a) the raising of US military strength by 30,000 troops (the ‘surge’); b) General Petraeus’s strategy of relying on Iraqi tribes to hunt down non-Iraqi Al-Qaeda fighters; c) the increase in, and proper training of Iraqi security forces; and d) the truce declared by Muqtada Sadr’s Mahdi Army, halting, at least at the time of writing, its assaults on both US forces and the Badr Brigade.

### Box 8-2 The ever-changing body count in Iraq

In 2007, a leading UK polling group produced a survey indicating that more than one million Iraqis have died as a result of the conflict in their country since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The survey, conducted by Opinion Research Business (ORB) with 2,414 adults in face-to-face interviews, found that 20 per cent of people had had at least one death in their household attributable to the conflict, rather than to natural causes. The last complete census in Iraq conducted in 1997 found 4.05 million households in the country, a figure ORB used to calculate that approximately 1.03 million people had died as a result of the war.

The margin of error in the survey, conducted in August and September 2007, was 1.7 per cent, giving a range of deaths of 946,258 to 1.12 million. ORB originally found that 1.2 million people had died, but decided to conduct more research in rural areas to make the survey as comprehensive as possible. It subsequently came up with the revised figure. The research covered 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Those not covered included two of Iraq’s more volatile regions—Kerbala and Anbar—and the northern province of Arbil, where local authorities refused them a permit to work.

In addition, fortifications surrounding the now mono-sectarian quarters have helped to keep out other fighting forces and to ward off sectarian assaults. It remains to be seen how the security situation will evolve with the gradual withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq and the rise of unfettered and armed militias.

**Box 8-3 The campaign against Gaza**

From the start of the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip on 27 December 2008 to the cease fire, implemented unilaterally by Israel on 18 January 2009, and later the same day by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, 1,314 Palestinians had been killed of whom 412 were children and 110 were women. Many more had been injured, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health. The number of those injured stood at 5,300, of whom 1,855 were children and 795 were women. Israeli operations caused extensive damage to homes and public infrastructure, and seriously jeopardized water, sanitation and medical services. UN schools sheltering displaced persons were hit, humanitarian workers were killed and ambulances struck, and the sick and wounded were left trapped and unassisted. By 15 January 2009, up to 90,000 people had been displaced from their homes.

**Alarming number of children killed and injured:** As of 15 January, almost 32 per cent of all fatalities (346) were children. Approximately 1,709 children were wounded, some with multiple injuries. From 3 January to 14 January, the number of child fatalities increased by more than 340 per cent. There are almost 800,000 children in Gaza, comprising 56 per cent of Gaza’s population in an area with one of the highest population densities in the world.

**Rapid increase of internal displacement:** The rise in the number of Palestinians seeking shelter at UNRWA facilities sharply accelerated after the Israeli ground operation began on 3 January. On 8 January, there were approximately 16,000 Palestinians staying at UNRWA facilities. By 14 January, 41 UNRWA facilities were providing shelter for 37,937 displaced persons. Although the total number of displaced Palestinians remains unknown, Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights has estimated 80,000 – 90,000 people displaced, including up to 50,000 children.

**B. The Occupied Palestinian Territory**

Fundamental human rights are frequently violated in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and such violations have intensified since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada on 29 September, 2000. Most threats to Palestinian human security come from Israeli forces. However, recently, another source of threat to Palestinian human security has emerged, originating within the Palestinian resistance itself. In the absence of a horizon for a political settlement with Israel, differences between the Palestinian organisations notably Fatah and Hamas have widened, culminating in the collapse of the national unity government which had brought together the two chief factions in the Palestinian national authority. The collapse occurred in the wake of armed clashes between these two camps, resulting in Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007. President Mahmoud Abbas subsequently formed a parallel government in Ramallah and, since then, each camp has claimed the sole right to represent the Palestinian people.

At the time this report was finalized in December 2008, the truce between Israel and Hamas had ended. Provoked by Hamas rocket attacks, Israel launched a counteroffensive against Gaza, which had already been under siege since Hamas took over the strip in June 2007. This campaign, which caused an international outcry over its use of disproportionate force, resulted in a significant number of civilian casualties (notably children and women) among a population that had already been impoverished by the siege. A cease-fire was implemented unilaterally by Israel on 18 January 2009, and later the same day by Hamas and other Palestinian factions.

Numerous sources document Israeli violations of Palestinian rights to life and freedom. This section relies on data from the Israeli human rights organisation, B’Tselem, whose figures on these violations are higher than those provided by...
both Palestinian human rights agencies and the Palestinian authorities themselves. B’Tselem furnishes the following information on the numbers of Palestinians and Israelis who died from violence in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel:

Figure 8-4 shows the breakdown by nationality of victim and assailant of a total of 5,970 deaths by violence in the OPT and Israel between 2000 and 2008: there were 4,908 fatalities among Palestinians and 1,062 fatalities among Israelis. B’Tselem also details the incidents that led to fatalities, the majority of which were among Palestinian civilians, as shown in Table 8-1. Internal strife between clashing Palestinian factions also brought about a considerable number of Palestinian deaths. Yet, the 594 victims of these conflicts represent barely 6 per cent of the total of those killed by Israelis.26 The purpose of this observation is not to belittle the gravity of inter-Palestinian violence, but rather to place it in its proper perspective. Moreover, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the total number of Palestinians injured by live ammunition, rubber bullets, gas and other weapons in the OPT between January 2000 and March 2008 amounted at 32,569.27

C. Somalia
Somalia has not experienced stability since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Years of African, Arab, and UN efforts failed to lead to the creation of a single government capable of controlling the whole country, and in particular autonomous Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the northeast. When the current TFG was formed in 2004, it had to operate initially out of Baidoa in the centre of the country, and only succeeded in establishing itself in the capital with the assistance of Ethiopian troops. The numerous domestic parties to the violence that erupted with the fall of the Barre regime...
The magnitude of the present Somali crisis dwarfs what the country has endured during the last decade.

In Somalia, a state is under siege. The entity, which was constructed on 1 July 1960 after the unification of the regions formerly under British and Italian administration, now risks being shattered by the storms assailing it. The transitional federal government (TFG) that emerged from the thirteenth national reconciliation conference held in 2004 is still struggling to bolster its authority and bring peace and stability to Mogadishu and the surrounding areas as it continues to wage battle with organised crime rings, anarchists, Islamist extremists, and separatists who oppose the restoration of the institutions of government in the country.

Under such conditions, Somalia is in danger of reverting to that primal state of nature, where, as the British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, put it, the life of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Indeed, some claim that Somalia has already succumbed to this state. How did the situation deteriorate so drastically? The primary responsibility for safeguarding human security in any country falls upon the state and its institutions and agencies of government. But if the state itself is unsafe and unstable, it is difficult to conceive how it can possibly undertake that role that is so vital to the state itself. Such a situation means it is impossible to restore the institutions of government in the country.

The state, indeed, shrank after the collapse in 1991 of Barre’s military dictatorship. It was reduced to a miniature of its past, its authority barely extending beyond the capital Mogadishu. The brutal one-man rule that had lasted for more than two decades had ended by consigning the state and its institutions to the scrap heap of history. Worse yet, the insurgents who had taken over the city brought havoc with them, committing mass murders and executing civilians for their tribal affiliations. Corruption reigned amid the plundering of the state and private property. Banks, museums, national archives, and government buildings were ransacked while industries and state-owned enterprises were dismantled and sold abroad. Not even electricity cables and water pipes were spared this fate. Anything of value was stolen for the purposes of enriching the rival warlords in Mogadishu and financing their militias.

From that time forward, Somalia was torn into two zones. One became a region of anarchy and lawlessness whose centre was in Mogadishu, in which resided the organised crime rings and outlaw militia groups called, respectively, the moryaan (parasites) and Islamist extremists, who have all made it impossible to restore the institutions of state. The second zone consists of the self-governing areas in the northeast and northwest of the country, known respectively as Puntland and Somaliland. Puntland is an officially autonomous state that continues to claim it is part of Somalia. On the other hand, the popularly elected government of Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1992 without securing international recognition.

While the secession of Somaliland represents a challenge to the TFG, it is the TFG’s role in the zone of anarchy and lawlessness that poses the greater danger to the state establishment in Somalia and to neighbouring states and the international community. A host of diverse interests have intertwined and taken root in this zone of anarchy. Their rages range from selling off the remains of foreign enterprises to importing food and medicines long past their sell-by dates, and from running terrorist military training camps to trafficking in drugs and appropriating public and private assets. Consequently, nothing is more feared or more likely to be resisted by this armed alliance between organised crime rings and Islamist extremists than the restoration of the institutions of the state.

Human security will remain a slippery mirage in Somalia until the TFG succeeds in restoring government and law and order to this zone of anarchy. This will require the concerted help of the African Union and the UN and successful negotiations with the two self-ruling entities, Puntland and Somaliland, with the objective of creating a Somali state on a non-centralised and democratic federal basis.

* Somali international legislator.
rockets, and artillery have been used with such little precision that those firing them have no reasonable expectation of striking any military target or avoiding civilian casualties.

According to the Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Somalia, children have been the victims of armed violence in many regions in Somalia, particularly those living in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) settlements close to military or government buildings. In the year between March 16, 2007 and March 15, 2008, violence between TFG and Ethiopian forces and anti-Government groups, including Al-Shabaab, remnants of ICU and Hawiya and other clan militias, led to high civilian casualties, particularly in Mogadishu. Over 1,850 people, including 217 children, wounded by weapons, were examined by one hospital in Mogadishu alone. More than 125 children were recorded by protection monitors as having been killed between 16 March 2007 and 15 March 2008—up from 82 reported in the preceding twelve months. The risks posed to children in Mogadishu by indiscriminate shelling, mortar attacks and gunfire increased during the first months of 2008. Thirty-three children, many under 10 years of age, were reported seriously wounded in the crossfire in just two districts of Mogadishu between February and mid-May 2008 alone. Child protection monitors have reported cases of children being injured or killed as a result of crossfire, mortar attacks, grenades or the rare targeted shooting, while in their homes, on the street, in the market, walking home from school or playing football.

The conduct of all parties has been questionable, in failing to warn civilians about potential fighting or to prevent looting, and in impeding relief efforts and mistreating dozens of people detained in mass arrest campaigns.

II. Threats to liberty

A further threat to human security in the three cases under discussion is unlawful arbitrary detention, which violates the fundamental human right to liberty. Many of the acts of arrest, imprisonment, detention, and abduction have been indiscriminate. This is especially the case in Iraq and Somalia, where, again, government forces and the militias that are locked in combat have all committed these violations.

### A. Iraq

The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that, according to the Ministry of Human Rights in Baghdad, by the end of June 2008, the total number of detainees, security internees and sentenced prisoners across Iraq stood at 50,595 with a peak at 56,320 at the end of March 2008. According to this report, out of this total, by the end of June 2008, 23,229 detainees were in the custody of the Multinational Forces; 17,152 detainees held by the Ministry of Justice; 613 detainees held by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; 5,535 held by the Ministry of Interior and 1,060 by the Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Multinational Forces (MNF) in Iraq, were, as of May 12, 2008, holding 513 Iraqi children as “imperative threats to security,” and have transferred an unknown number of other children to Iraqi custody. HRW also notes that children in Iraqi custody are at risk of physical abuse.

According to HRW, the swell in the total number of detainees across Iraq and those held by the MNF as reflected in Table 8-2, resulted from Iraq’s broad counter-terrorism legislation, which has been the main legal basis for arrests and prosecutions stemming from the Baghdad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Total number of detainees, security internees and sentenced prisoners across Iraq</th>
<th>Number of detainees held by the Multinational Forces (MNF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan – 28 Feb 2006</td>
<td>29,565</td>
<td>14,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mar – 30 Apr 2006</td>
<td>28,700</td>
<td>15,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May – 30 Jun 2006</td>
<td>25,707</td>
<td>12,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul – 31 Aug 2006</td>
<td>35,542</td>
<td>13,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sept – 31 Oct 2006</td>
<td>29,256</td>
<td>13,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov – 31 Dec 2006</td>
<td>30,842</td>
<td>14,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan – 31 Mar 2007</td>
<td>37,641</td>
<td>17,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr – 30 Jun 2007</td>
<td>44,325</td>
<td>21,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan – 30 Jun 2008</td>
<td>50,595</td>
<td>23,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detention, imprisonment, and kidnapping are the second most serious human rights abuse in the OPT.\footnote{The security plan, launched in conjunction with the US troop surge of 2007, rapidly expanded detainee populations in Iraqi and MNF custody. The cruelty of conditions of imprisonment and captivity in Iraq has become public knowledge. In June 2007, UNAMI expressed concern about the internment of suspects in MNF custody for prolonged periods without judicial review of their cases, and administrative review procedures that do not grant detainees due process in accordance with internationally recognized norms. Some of the prisons operated by the Iraqi ministries had been secret establishments unearthed by the US forces which, in turn, sometimes practiced forms of torture that stirred international outrage when the media in the United States published reports and photographs of acts committed in Abu Ghraib prison. In February 2007, the Iraqi prime minister issued orders granting military leaders broad powers to detain individuals and restrict their freedoms of expression and assembly. The authority to arrest without warrant was only one of the powers granted to military leaders in the name of preventing further escalation of the conflict. Prison conditions and practices have been among factors adding to political tension in Iraq, which finally moved the foreign military authorities and the Iraq government, in late 2007, to begin to eliminate secret jails and clean up prison procedures. Kidnapping is another violation of liberty. The UNAMI report of May-June 2006 notes that this has become one of the most widespread crimes in Iraq. Kidnappers normally request significant amounts of money from the victims’ families, or, if the victims are foreigners, make political demands on their countries of origin. Many hostages are killed even after ransom is paid. Foreign hostages are killed if their country does not meet the kidnappers’ demands, or to settle a score with the government of the country concerned. UNAMI has also received reports of sectarian connotations connected with some kidnappings, as well as alleged collusion between kidnappers and the police.}

B. The Occupied Palestinian Territory

Detention, imprisonment, and kidnapping are the second most serious human rights abuse in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Amnesty International confirms that Israeli authorities have arrested many thousands of Palestinians since the turn of the century. Approximately 10,000 remain in custody in some thirty detention centers, according to Palestine’s Ministry of Prisoners’ Affairs. Some have been deprived of their liberty for many years. The rulings were handed down by military courts whose procedures failed to meet international standards for fair trial. Fewer numbers—about 700 individuals detained in October 2006 according to Amnesty International estimates—are under administrative custody, which is to say, detained without being charged and without the intention of being brought to trial.

On the other hand, Amnesty International also points out that, in the OPT, the governments in the West Bank and Gaza have both abused the right to liberty of the Palestinians under their authority, especially following the armed clash between Fatah and Hamas in 2007. In the West Bank, there has been a marked deterioration in the human rights situation. Arbitrary detention of suspected Hamas supporters by Palestinian Authority security forces has become routine and detainees are often subject to torture or other ill-treatment. Similarly, in Gaza, arbitrary detentions and torture or other ill-treatment of detainees by Hamas forces are now widespread and the initial improvements in the security situation...
that followed Hamas’s takeover are fast being eroded.40

C. Somalia
As formidable as the threats to human security in Somalia remain, restricting the freedom of civilians has not necessarily taken the form of arrest and imprisonment. This is hardly an indication of the rule of law but rather of its opposite, a lawless situation where dysfunction characterizes even the workings of oppression, and where warring factions frequently resort to more violent forms of persecution. In most of the country, judicial systems are not well established, are not based on codified law, do not work, or simply do not exist. Against this background, information in the African press and from human rights organisations does not suggest a markedly high rate of arbitrary detention and imprisonment, although internment without trial and mistreatment of prisoners are practiced by all parties to the Somali conflict. In Mogadishu, dissidents have been imprisoned for opposing the government and on suspicion of conducting anti-Islamic activities. In Somaliland, the government has arrested journalists and harassed others. Public floggings of convicted or suspected offenders are a common occurrence.41

According to Human Rights Watch, TFG police personnel have frequently arrested residents of Mogadishu on suspicion of links to the insurgency.42 Persons who are arrested as suspected insurgents often face abusive interrogation at the hands of TFG officers.

III. Threats to economic conditions and livelihoods

In all three cases examined here, occupation and military intervention and the different forms of violence they spark have been highly detrimental to economic conditions, as this section illustrates.

A. Iraq
Under conditions of insecurity, internal strife, and the impacts of the hasty economic transition that Iraq was launched on after 2003, the Iraqi economy cannot be expected to revive sufficiently in the short term. The former Baath regime had clearly wasted Iraq’s resources and left behind an economy ruined by years of wars, sanctions, economic mismanagement, fitful development, infrastructural and institutional collapse, and meagre opportunities for private enterprise. (Salah Al-Nasrawi, in Arabic, background paper for the report)

Even so, bad as Iraq’s economic legacy was, it does not compare to the economic breakdown that followed the US-led invasion of Iraq. The slight recovery that has occurred since mid-2007 has not had a tangible impact on general standards of living. World Bank figures indicate that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Iraq dropped at a rate of 11.4 per cent annually between 2000 and 2006. This deterioration was a consequence of a drop in industrial production by 17 per cent annually and a 3.6 per cent decline in agricultural production. Production in the manufacturing industries fell by 12.8 per cent annually.43

A study on Iraq by the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States describes the economy as hobbled by rampant unemployment, sluggish growth, and sub-par oil revenues.44 Of the nearly $20 billion of US-appropriated funds to jump-start the private sector in Iraq, only $805 million had been spent by mid-2007. Meanwhile, GDP growth remains at about 4 per cent, although estimates vary. In part, this is due to the fact that Iraqi oil revenues, estimated at $3 billion per month, are considerably less than the potential of the country’s enormous reserves.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), data from different sources covering the period from 2004 to the end of 2006 suggests that as many as 1.3 to 2 of the 7 million-strong labour force were unemployed.45 Unemployment among the young (15-24 years), at around 30 per cent, has been nearly double the overall unemployment rate.

Oil market sources say that while Iraqi oil production has begun to climb again, as of March 2008 it had not yet reached this target. Oil production rose from 2.290 million barrels per day in January 2008 to 2.4 million barrels per day in February 2008 but then fell off to 2.37 million barrels per day in March 2008.46 The study does note some positive trends in the Iraqi economy. It cites the claims

Internment without trial and mistreatment of prisoners are practiced by all parties to the Somali conflict

Gross Domestic Product in Iraq dropped at a rate of 11.4 per cent annually between 2000 and 2006
of some analysts that the actual growth rate is about 17 per cent, that salaries have doubled since 2003, that cheaper goods are now available in the market and that the numbers of mobile phone subscribers and internet users have skyrocketed. The study also notes that the economy of the Northern Kurdish zone is prospering. Nevertheless, it concludes that, on the whole, standards of living are still lower than they were before the invasion and that pre-war oil production peak levels were higher than in 2007, four years after the invasion.

The Council on Foreign Relations study attributes Iraq’s poor economic performance to four factors, all connected with the military intervention:

1. **Lack of security**: private investors continue to stay away because of the high-risk security situation and because the precautions it demands increase transport time, production costs and the costs of doing business in general.

2. **Oil smuggling**: lack of controls and smuggling contribute to sub-optimal oil production levels. A May 2007 report by the US Government Accountability Office estimates that oil valued at between $5 million and $15 million—or roughly between 100,000 and 300,000 barrels per day—has been siphoned off daily since 2003 as result of collusion between corrupt officials, smugglers, and insurgents. Smugglers can earn as much as $5 million per week in parts of southern Iraq. Although about $7.4 billion has been spent to rebuild Iraq’s electricity and oil sectors, output in both sectors remains below pre-war levels.

3. **Bureaucratic inertia**: given high levels of insecurity, rampant corruption and a fragmented society, government agencies cannot perform efficiently. The problem is further exacerbated by a high turnover of public employees, which began with the dismantling of the government by the Bremer administration, and the lack of skilled technocrats.

4. **Brain drain**: conditions generated by the military intervention have caused an estimated two million Iraqis to flee the country, many of them highly skilled professionals such as engineers and doctors. Some estimates indicate that 40 per cent of Iraq’s professional class has fled the country. In addition, an aspect of the violence rooted in class divisions is the singling out of professionals by militias. Around two thousand Iraqi physicians have been killed since 2003, for example. Also, according to UNICEF, enrolment in Iraqi schools has dropped 45 per cent between 2005 and 2007 owing to “missing teachers.”

Another study attributes the economic deterioration in Iraq directly to the actions of US forces. The country’s poor economic performance, it observes, is also due to the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure during the first Gulf War and the war on Iraq in 2003. The damages resulting from the Second Gulf War such as repeated attacks on power generators as well as other facilities have complicated the task of infrastructure reconstruction following the invasion in 2003.

An Iraqi researcher has detailed the effects of rampant corruption in Iraq. In his view, the corruption that took hold after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 drove the country to ruin (Salah Al-Nasrawi, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

Within weeks, corruption began to spread at an unprecedented rate such that, by 2008, Transparency International ranked Iraq second from the top of 180 nations in terms of public sector corruption.
B. The Occupied Palestinian Territory

Forty one years of occupation, as well as the expansion of Israeli settlements, have prevented Palestinians from controlling their own affairs, and render illusory any notion of the economy as a means of meeting their most basic needs.

According to a report of the UN Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly in May 2008, Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank has taken place under every Government since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In 2007, there were more than 450,000 settlers living in 149 settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. According to United Nations sources, almost 40 per cent of the West Bank is now taken up by Israeli infrastructure associated with the settlements, including roads, barriers, buffer zones and military bases.

In June 2002, Israel began construction of a wall on the line separating it from the West Bank. When complete, approximately 10.2 per cent of West Bank territory, including East Jerusalem, will be isolated by the wall and physically connected to Israel. In 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory ruling that the wall violated international law. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities continue to violate Palestinian Authority (PA) autonomy by controlling transportation networks, border crossings, the airport, and extensive portions of land. In addition, they restrict the Palestinians’ freedom of movement by forcing them to pass through checkpoints. By September 2007, the West Bank had 607 such checkpoints where Palestinians, regardless of the urgency of their needs, were forced to stand for long hours in inspection queues before being allowed to go on to their destinations.

Other Israeli practices have impaired the Palestinians’ ability to conduct their economic affairs in a stable and predictable way. This applies as much to wage earners as it does to business owners. Prominent among such practices is the policy of closures in the OPT, which paralyses the movement of people, goods and services at many levels. Another detrimental practice is the withholding of disbursals to the PA from tax revenues levied by Israel. There is also the total embargo that Israel imposed on Gaza following Hamas’s electoral victory in January 2006, an embargo Israel tightened further in the wake of the fissure between Hamas and Fatah in 2007.

A 2008 World Bank study on the costs of the closures regime in the West Bank and Gaza explains that this policy imposes three types of restrictions on the movement of Palestinians: internal closures, which restrict free mobility inside the West Bank and Gaza; external closures, which restrict access from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel and Jerusalem; and external international closures, which restrict access from the West Bank to Jordan and from Gaza to Egypt. To drive home the extent of the closures regime, the report notes that, in November 2005, there were more than 600 physical barriers (more than ten per square kilometre), consisting of 61 full-time and 6 partially staffed checkpoints, 102 roadblocks, 48 road gates, 374 earth mounds, 28 earth walls and 61 trenches.

### Table 8-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Number of partly damaged buildings</th>
<th>Number of completely damaged buildings</th>
<th>Number of damaged public buildings</th>
<th>Number of damaged security buildings</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>42,752</td>
<td>2,855</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>45,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>26,578</td>
<td>5,248</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>31,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>69,330</td>
<td>8,103</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77,759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PCBS 2008.
Closures fragment the Palestinian economic space. Cut off by impediments to mobility, and unable to predict when closures will occur, Palestinian villages and towns struggle to survive on whatever resources they have. The frequent revocation of permits for West Bank and Gaza residents working in Israel diminishes their income, as does the reduction of working days for labourers unable to reach their jobs in Israel or in the West Bank. Closures also make it difficult for businesses to obtain the intermediate supplies they need to produce goods, and to market them in areas other than their own.

The World Bank study estimates that a single full-day closure inflicts a $7 million dollar income-related loss in the West Bank and Gaza. For 2001 to 2005, the total employment-related loss is estimated at $2.4 billion and the total closure-related loss is estimated at $928 million, which comes to a total estimated loss of $3.3 billion for that period, or the equivalent of 58 per cent of the total foreign aid provided to the PA.

The economic costs of closures go beyond their impact on income. Production costs rise sharply when closures force goods to move via long detours, or when they block commerce altogether. According to the World Bank study, between 2000 and 2005, transportation costs from Ramallah to Bethlehem soared by 348 per cent; from Ramallah to Nablus by 105 per cent; and from Ramallah to Jenin by 167 per cent. Such handicaps reduce the competitiveness of the Palestinian economy and deter investment.

It is thus hardly surprising that poverty and unemployment are widespread among Palestinians. The Human Development Report 2007/2008 records that, from 1990 to 2005, the West Bank and Gaza registered a negative annual per capita GDP growth rate of -2.9 per cent. It further records that, between 1996 and 2005, unemployment affected more than a quarter of the labour force (26.7 per cent) and that the ratio of unemployed women to men was 71 per cent.

A 2003 World Bank report on the state of the Palestinian economy two years after the Al Aqsa intifada noted a sharp decline in all major economic indicators. By the end of August 2002, per capita income had dropped to half its 2001 level, joblessness affected half of the labour force, and infrastructure had sustained $728 million worth of damage. Moreover, Palestinian exports were down by half, imports by a third, and the volume of investment, at $140 million, was then less than a tenth of its 1999 level, when it had reached $1.5 billion. The report added that the chief cause of the Palestinian crisis was Israel’s blockade.

Another report, from the International Labour Organisation in 2008, observes that one in three people of working age (15 years and above) was employed full or part time in the OPT. Annual per capita GDP stabilised in 2007 at $1,178, which is some 27 per cent below its historic peak of 1999. In November 2007, extreme poverty affected 40 per cent of the population in Gaza and 19 per cent in the West Bank, lower than the levels of the previous year owing mostly to the resumption of wage
The Palestinians have paid a heavy price for exercising their democratic rights via the ballot box. After the peaceful January 2006 election which put Hamas in power, international financial aid stopped flowing. Although this aid has become available again to the Fatah government in the West Bank since the break with Hamas, there has been no radical improvement in economic conditions, primarily because of Israel’s repeated incursions into these areas. What is new, however, is the punishment that Israel has inflicted on Gaza following the Hamas takeover in the strip. Such punishment has taken the form of a total blockade, obstructing all communication with the outside world for whatever purpose. The measure has induced the collapse of most industrial and agricultural activity in the area, disrupted essential infrastructure and services through frequent and long power shortages, and further damaged water quality. The Israeli assault on Gaza that began on December 27, 2008 created massive infrastructural damage and marked a new level of violence in the treatment of Palestinian civilians.

C. Somalia

The country collapsed in 1991 after the overthrow of Siad Barre, into a stateless existence, with Somaliland and Puntland as the two northern secessionist regions. This collapse outlasted US and international military intervention in the early 1990s. Over the past few years, an attempt at unification was made, with ideological underpinnings, led by the so-called Islamic Courts Union in an effort to extend central authority over most of Somalia. The efforts, however, were thwarted by an outright military intervention by Ethiopia in December 2006 to support the TFG. Despite such efforts at ‘unification’, the Somali state is a fragile construct that risks reverting to the kind of failed state it was known as in the preceding two decades.

The record of Somalia’s central government since the 1960s and 1970s shows that, owing to a low resource base, the government either relied on foreign assistance (the Soviet Union at the time) or adopted highly inefficient economic policies (in the

**Box 8-5** Piracy in Somalia

Piracy off the coast of Somalia is growing at an alarming rate and threatens to drastically disrupt international trade. It provides funds that feed the vicious war in Somalia and could potentially become a weapon of international terrorism or a cause of environmental disaster. Up to 30 September 2008, 63 actual and attempted hijacks had been recorded by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Since end-2007, piracy activity has shifted away from the Mogadishu port area and into the Gulf of Aden. Some 16,000 ships a year pass through the Gulf of Aden, carrying oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America. So one of the most important trade routes in the world is now threatened by the chronic instability in Somalia.

Piracy has been a problem in Somali waters for at least ten years. However, the number of attempted and successful attacks has risen over the last three years. The only period during which piracy virtually vanished around Somalia was during the six months of rule by the Islamic Courts Union in the second half of 2006. This indicates that a functioning government in Somalia is capable of controlling piracy. After the removal of the courts, piracy re-emerged. With little functioning government, long, isolated, sandy beaches and a population that is both desperate and used to war, Somalia offers a perfect environment for piracy to thrive.

Puntland, the semi-autonomous region in the northeast of the country, appears to be the base for most pirates in Somalia. It is one of the poorest areas of Somalia, so the financial attraction of piracy is strong. Somalia’s fishing industry has collapsed in the last fifteen years and its waters are being heavily fished by European, Asian and African ships. Some pirates have claimed that they are involved in protecting Somalia’s natural resources and that ransom payments should be viewed as legitimate taxation. In a region where legitimate business is difficult, where drought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming, and instability and violence make death a very real prospect, the dangers of engaging in piracy must be weighed against the potentially massive returns.

In late 2007, the danger of Somali waters forced the World Food Programme (WFP) to suspend food deliveries by sea (the route by which ninety per cent of all WFP food deliveries for Somalia is delivered since transport by land is just as risky and is impractical for conveying large quantities of food aid). In November 2007, through the implementation of a naval escort system, WFP was able to resume its food deliveries to Somalia. Since then, although no pirate attacks have been reported, naval escorts for ships carrying WFP food continue to be absolutely essential to ward off the ever-present threat of piracy. In a country without a functioning central government that is suffering from drought and war, and with over a million internally displaced people, imported food aid is essential.

While pirates themselves keep the majority of the funds they generate, a significant amount is passed on to important locals, some of whom are involved in the ongoing war. These regular injections of cash undoubtedly help to finance the war. Eradicating piracy will not stop the war, but it may reduce the money available for arms purchases. The lack of maritime security also allows a busy people- and arms-smuggling trade to flourish and encourages illegal fishing in Somali waters. Large oil tankers pass through the Gulf of Aden and the danger exists that a pirate attack could cause a major oil spill in what is a very sensitive and important ecosystem. As pirates become bolder and use ever more powerful weaponry, a tanker could be set on fire, sunk or forced ashore, any of which could result in an environmental catastrophe that would devastate marine and bird life for years to come.

Public infrastructure has been destroyed and key public institutions do not exist

According to the World Bank, in 2002, in Somalia overall, the distribution of total unemployment rates amounts to 65.5 per cent (urban), 40.7 per cent (rural) and 47.4 per cent (national). These figures are only indicative, as they do not take into account the extent of underemployment, seasonal unemployment, etc.

The proportion of population living in extreme poverty is estimated as 43.2 per cent for Somalia, for the year 2002. The extreme poverty in urban areas is 23.5 per cent and in rural and nomadic areas 53.4 per cent. In absolute terms, the population living in extreme poverty is estimated as 2.94 million, consisting of 0.54 million in urban and 2.4 million in rural and nomadic areas. General poverty estimates based on the number of people living on $2 per day are 73.4 per cent for Somalia, consisting of 60.7 per cent for urban and 79.9 per cent for rural and nomadic areas. According to this measure, 5 million people in Somalia live in poverty; 1.4 million in urban and 3.6 million in rural and nomadic areas.

IV. Threats to people’s access to food, health and education

With the violence, poverty, unemployment, and displacement of persons that accompany occupation and military intervention, people’s opportunities to obtain sufficient food, appropriate health care, and adequate housing inevitably crumble.

A. Iraq

In Iraq, the worsening food crisis, which had reached worrisome proportions under sanctions, and the failure of the oil-for-food programme, led to a sharp rise in starvation. Indeed, the extent of the situation required international agencies and organizations to respond with emergency food aid to the Iraqi people. Foremost among these were the World Food Programme (WFP) and Oxfam. By the beginning of 2008, the WFP launched a 12-month emergency operation worth US$126 million to provide food assistance for up to 750,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Oxfam, which initiated a similar programme, estimated the number of people unable to obtain food in Iraq at four million.

The invasion of Iraq came on top of twelve years of sanctions and, before then, the Iraq-Iran war, both of which damaged Iraq’s ability to sustain and operate health care services. Before the invasion, the infant mortality rate was 102 per 1,000, the maternal mortality rate was 291 per 100,000, and the malnourishment rate had climbed to 19 per cent of the population. Five years later, the state of health in Iraq had worsened as a result of several factors (Samer Jabbour and Iman Nuwayhid, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

Firstly, the security breakdown in the immediate aftermath of the invasion unleashed a wave of pillaging and plundering that did not spare hospitals and medical centres. Secondly, the continuing violence and counter-violence gravely disrupted the health system while creating new pressures on hospitals, clinics and paramedical services. As mentioned earlier, estimates of mortalities from this violence between March 2003 and June 2006 range from about 47,000 to nearly 600,000 and the numbers of wounded were much greater than these figures. Thirdly, standards of living fell sharply: a survey conducted in Iraq in 2004 found that 54 per cent of the families polled had access only to non-potable water, 78 per cent suffered daily power blackouts, and 36 per cent did not have appropriate sanitary facilities in their homes. Fourthly, according to a joint report by the World Health Organisation and its Middle East bureau, a total of 18,000 doctors—a quarter of the total number of Iraqi doctors—and unknown numbers of nurses, dentists, and pharmacists have left Iraq. (Samer Jabbour and Iman Nuwayhid, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

Damage, neglect and violence since 2003 have devastated Iraq’s health sector. Public hospitals suffer from chronic systems failures: elevators, heating systems, air conditioning and sewage systems all frequently break down, decrepit kitchens and laundry rooms cannot keep up with
mounting needs, and a lack of medicines, equipment and materials often brings emergency wards and operating theaters to a halt. These are common challenges in all health institutions in Iraq, even those formerly well equipped. A report by the Committee of the International Red Cross (ICRC) states that Iraqi hospitals are overflowing with more caseloads than they can handle, swollen further by victims of street violence. Many lack sufficient medicines and medical supplies. Half of those admitted to hospitals following outbreaks of violence die because specialized medical teams and blood are unavailable.

Primary health care centres are also clogged and under-supported by a centralized health system that has collapsed. Efforts are in progress to put the system back on its feet under extremely difficult circumstances. Child health has been markedly affected; however, conditions have also been harsh on adults. Widespread insecurity, combined with the inability to obtain adequate health services, has led to delays or gaps in treating non-communicable diseases. Not surprisingly, symptoms of trauma associated with violent circumstances are on the rise in Iraq. Anxiety and depression are common in most communities in Iraq, and mental illness will probably rise in the face of continued disruption of the social fabric and of the protection offered by the family and local community. It is noticeable—and regrettable—that most reports on the state of psychological health focus almost exclusively on the foreign forces (Samer Jabbour and Iman Nuwayhid, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

According to a report by Save the Children, 122,000 Iraqi children died in 2005 before reaching the age of five. Medical reports have cautioned that such diseases as pneumonia, malaria, measles, and dysentery form the primary cause of children’s deaths in Iraq.

Another growing phenomenon is the employment of minors, which conflicts with international conventions regarding the employment and use of children at work. Several international, regional, and Iraqi reports, including some by human rights and civil society organisations, affirm that underage employment in Iraq has spread considerably, even among children below ten, and in activities unsuited to their age and physical makeup. It has become a familiar sight to see children cleaning streets, especially now that the municipality of Baghdad and other municipalities have hired minors as “sanitation workers” for less than a dollar a day, which has lured innumerable children away from school.

A third grave development affecting children is the rise in truancy and school drop-out rates. Circumstances of material need and abject poverty are responsible, but these are aggravated by the dangerous security conditions. The rising levels of violence and terrorism, and especially ethnic and sectarian cleansing, have forced hundreds of thousands of families to leave their homes and take refuge in other areas which have no provisions for additional children.

Children are pressed into strenuous and dangerous activities, such as construction work, domestic services and, recently, as gangs of body guards, or in public or privately owned workshops and factories. The human rights office of the UNAMI has warned, in a special report, of a humanitarian catastrophe against the children of Iraq, who suffer from cruel social and health problems and from declining levels of education. The report appealed for efforts to guarantee a suitable standard of living for children that will reflect positively on their life in general and the life of society as a whole. Other reports tell of addictions that have become widespread among minors, such as drugs, various intoxicants, and cigarettes. According to one, at the end of 2004, more than a million minors work in harsh circumstances and are exposed to sexual abuse and violence.

Scenes of violence and war daily overshadow growing children’s lives. Ethnic and sectarian tensions, cleansing and evacuation operations, daily murders over identity, and unidentifiable headless bodies may not immediately endanger children but will certainly scar their psyches, affect their relations with others and leave them feeling more insecure in future.

B. The Occupied Palestinian Territory
In the West Bank and Gaza, economic decline is clearly reflected in the food supply situation. According to the ILO, approximately half of all Palestinian households are dependent on food assistance...
provided by the international community. Some 33 per cent (or 0.7 million people) of what was formerly a middle-income society in the West Bank now relies on food aid. Worse still, the figure for Gaza stands at 80 per cent of households, or 1.3 million people.

Prevailing health conditions similarly reflect a slumping economy. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the Israeli authorities were in charge of health conditions in the West Bank and Gaza until this responsibility was transferred to the PA in 1994. In spite of forty one years of occupation, Palestinians, in 2004, enjoyed reasonable levels of health: an average annual income of $1,026, a 91 per cent literacy rate, a life expectancy of 72, a low infant mortality rate (20.5 per 1,000 births)78 and a low maternity mortality rate (11 deaths out of 100,000 live births). The reason for this is to be found in the Palestinian spirit of solidarity and the support given by civil society to health care centres and other medical institutions. However, these conditions began to deteriorate after 2003 with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, the construction of the separation wall, and the blockade of Palestinian territories.

Figure 8—9 Food aid dependence and extreme poverty, West Bank and Gaza, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of households dependent on international food assistance</th>
<th>Percentage of population living in extreme poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Together, the wall, along with the check points, road barriers, and blockades that stiffen Palestinian towns and villages, have cut off access to 41 health care facilities and obstructed access to others, as well as to schools and places of work. Thirty six per cent of these health care facilities reported that many of their patients can no longer reach them, 53 per cent reported receiving additional patients diverted to them by the blockade, 63 per cent encountered delays in providing emergency services, and 55 per cent of them had difficulty obtaining medicines for the treatment of chronic illnesses. When completed, the wall is expected to isolate a total of 71 clinics and will become a barrier even to Palestinian ambulances which are forbidden to enter in the area between the wall and the 1967 Green Line (Samer Jabbour and Iman Nuwayhid, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the absence of a budget in 2006 and the Western boycott of the Palestinian government caused an acute educational crisis. This was aggravated by the strike of employees in the education sector in protest against non-payment of wages, which deprived public school children of their right to education and forced some 2,000 higher education students to interrupt their studies for about two months.79

From 2000 to 2005, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education, 300 schools were closed down and eight universities bombed. In March 2004, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights reported that seventy-three educational institutes, including occupational training institutes, were destroyed in Gaza. Also, according to these records, the University of Hebron and the Hebron Polytechnic were kept closed throughout 2003, to the detriment of 60,000 Palestinian students. In the same year, the University of Jerusalem was threatened by the construction of a wall that would have divided the university and appropriated a third of its land. Only after an international campaign against this violation was the wall relocated outside the university compound.80

Roadblocks and similar obstacles to freedom of movement have also had an impact on education in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. For example, between April 2001 and December 2003, the earth mound barrier on the Sarda road from Ramallah to Birzeit University in the West Bank caused such delays that commuting times for students and professors doubled; occasionally the Israeli authorities would prohibit passage altogether. Because of this, two-thirds of the second
2001/2002 academic term were lost, forcing a two-month extension at the expense of the summer term. Birzeit was thus unable to fulfil its role as an institute open to all members of the same nation, because most of its students were unable to reach their university. From 2000 to 2005, Gazan enrolment at the university dropped from 400 to thirteen. In the 2004/2005 academic year, the enrolment rate of students from Jenin and Nablus in the northern West Bank dropped from 120 per year to zero.

In addition, throughout the Territory, primary school enrolment has been eroded by frequent obstacles to pupils’ access. The real fear is that, with these reductions in attendance and enrolment, Palestinian schools and universities will become increasingly unable to contribute to the development of Palestinian society as a whole.

C. Somalia

The ongoing civil conflicts in Somalia, coming on top of widespread poverty, weak infrastructure and poor health conditions, have gravely impacted health conditions. Mortality rates among infants, children under five and women during birth in Somalia are among the highest in the world: 90 infant deaths per 1,000 births in 2006, 145 deaths per 1,000 children below the age of five in 2006 and 1,400 women per 100,000 live births in 2005. Dehydration from illnesses related to dysentery, pulmonary ailments, and malaria are among the chief causes of death for infants and young children, accounting for more than half of children’s deaths. Inoculations against the major paediatric diseases covered only 20 per cent of children in 1998. Malnourishment and anaemia are also widespread.

In Somalia, average life expectancy at birth was under 47 in 2006. The country has the world’s highest rates of tuberculosis infection, at 374 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2003, there were more than 30,000 cases of malaria. In addition, numerous cases of polio were discovered that year and, by 2006, it had become impossible to stem the spread of that disease. The country has always lacked resources and systems for providing primary health care. However, the situation is even worse at present, as there are only four doctors, less than one dentist, less than one medical assistant, and nine nurses for every 100,000 persons. Somalia could well lose some of the health care workers who remain, for many must be eager to emigrate in search of a safer life and better income (Samer Jabbour and Iman Nuwayhid, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

World Food Programme statistics indicate that a large proportion of the population suffers undernourishment. More than a fifth of the undernourished are located in severe food insecurity areas such as the Juba Valley and the Gedo, Bakol, and Bay regions of the south. There are approximately 1.53 million recipients of food relief across Somalia. In education, primary school net enrolment dropped to 22 per cent of school-age children during 2000-2006, which lowered the adult literacy rate to 19.2 per cent. According to a survey conducted in 2002 by UNDP and the World Bank, Somalia has one of the lowest school enrolment rates in Africa. The primary school enrolment survey undertaken by UNICEF estimated the number of pupils enrolled in grades 1-8 as 286,808, consisting of 64 per cent boys and 36 per cent girls for 2002. These enrolment figures were used to estimate the primary school enrolment rates for boys and girls with the estimated population for the corresponding age...
groups. The overall primary school enrolment rate is 16.9 per cent for Somalia, 20.8 per cent for boys and 12.7 per cent for girls. Moreover, thousands of orphaned and homeless children have been left to struggle alone against brutal conditions. Among the young, the recruitment of children by militias is widespread, a sad development that is recorded in UN reports and which is discussed in Chapter 4.

Somalia’s overall adult literacy rate is one of the lowest in the world and varies from 34.9 per cent in urban areas to 10.9 per cent in rural and nomadic regions. The female adult literacy rate in the latter regions is as low as 6.7 per cent. This partly reflects the lack of educational opportunities after the civil war, particularly in remote areas, where a large proportion of the school-age population missed out on opportunities for basic education.

V. Threat to the environment

As a form of warfare, occupation and military intervention can impact ecosystems in two key respects. The environment, itself, may be a source of the conflict in that it contains the resources over which competition may arise and intensify into armed conflict. At the same time, the environment itself can be damaged by warfare arising from this competition or other causes of conflict. For example, warfare harms the environment through the destruction of agriculture and infrastructure, which the state must rehabilitate after the cessation of hostilities at considerable cost. But even after the fighting ends, the environment is still at risk from the detritus of war, such as undetonated bombs, discarded weapons, collapsed buildings, sunken ships and crashed airplanes, not to mention landmines and toxic debris released into the water or air.

A. Iraq

The 2003 war led to occasional uncontrolled dumping of municipal waste into the streets, owing to the failure of collection systems, looting or restrictions. In addition, the conflict generated large volumes of demolition waste from bomb-damaged buildings (potentially impacted by depleted uranium and asbestos) and military hardware (vehicles, unexploded ordnance, and depleted uranium). During the war in Iraq, water, air, and soil were all contaminated by various pollutants. In addition to the dumping of war debris into the Tigris, frequent power blackouts obstructed water supplies, forcing people to turn to unsafe water sources. An example of air pollution in wartime occurred on 20 March 2003 when Iraqi authorities set fire to the Al-Rumeila oilfield in order to cloud the sights of attacking aircraft. The smoke from the oilfields could be seen from Kuwait. Iraqi authorities employed this tactic in other locations. The heavy smoke contained noxious substances that affected the health of civilians and combatants alike. Trenches dug during the war exposed the soil, subterranean water resources, and drinking water to contamination.

B. The Occupied Palestinian Territory

Israeli policies have negatively affected the environment in the territories. Among the gravest impacts is the enormous attrition of Palestinian water resources, which has undermined general water conditions. The annual water deficit in the West Bank and in Gaza is as high as 50 million cubic metres a year and water pollution rates are high. In 90 per cent of the water supplies, chloride concentrations range from 250 to 2,000 millilitres/litre (international standards stipulate that levels should not exceed 250 millilitres per litre) while nitrate concentrations also exceed the internationally acceptable level of 50 millilitres/litre. Israel’s actions have also contributed to the deterioration of the Palestinian environment through its neglect of wastewater systems in the territories and its failure to meet international health standards in this regard. Settlements pour millions of cubic metres of wastewater into riverbeds and elsewhere on Palestinian land. In the West Bank alone, settlements inhabited by some 350,000 settlers pump out 40 million cubic metres of waste water a year, compared to 33.72 million cubic metres produced by the entire Palestinian population in the West Bank. In Gaza, wastewater flows into sandy areas or is removed by tanker trucks and pumped into Wadi al-Salqa, Wadi Gaza, and other...
C. Somalia

The military intervention in Somalia came on top of, and further accelerated, a breakdown of legislative and traditional controls over the use of and access to natural resources. According to the World Conservation Union, group struggles, land grabs and pressures on resources have long ravaged Somalia and visibly degraded its environment. The damage, which successive foreign interventions and conflicts have aggravated, is reflected in advancing deforestation near, but no longer limited to, populated areas; in the over-fishing of selectively targeted marine species by foreign fisheries operating illegally offshore; in desertification hastened by over-grazing and the mismanagement of land tenure in a chaotic and predatory political and military context; and in the rise of a rapacious charcoal trade, mainly to Gulf countries, that is responsible for accelerating deforestation and thus worsening annual flooding and soil erosion.

The charcoal trade in Somalia takes a heavy toll on the acacia forests of southern Somalia which provide ecological stability for pastoralists. Profiteering traders clear entire swaths of forest mostly for shipment abroad. Turning cut wood into charcoal is a dirty process that pollutes the local air. In 2000, total charcoal production was estimated to be 112,000 metric tons; by 2005, it was estimated at 150,000 metric tons of which approximately 80 per cent is destined for stoves in the Gulf States, while only 20 per cent is for domestic consumption. Another cruel exploitation of Somalia’s lawless situation has been the dumping in local waters of toxic waste from pesticides used in Europe.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the exponential impacts of military intervention on human security in three Arab cases. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Somalia, occupation and military intervention have exacted a heavy price in terms of lost lives and freedoms, with negative repercussions on income, employment, nutrition, health, education and the environment. They have sparked both legitimate resistance and a cycle of violence and counter-violence that engulfs occupied and occupier alike and that spills over into adjacent countries, disrupting human and national security across a wider front.

Prospects for settling the three major conflicts are very largely governed by the will of non-Arab parties. Yet Arab states have a role to play. Even when Arab governments have adopted unified positions on some of these questions, they have failed to abide by the commitments they have consequently undertaken, or to put their resolutions into effect.

The question posed by current conditions is, what action should be taken to end military intervention? It is useful to recall that, in all three cases, with all their different circumstances, the invading powers or occupying authorities have acknowledged that their presence or occupation is temporary. The government of Israel has not refuted the concept of two states, one Israeli, the other Palestinian, living side by side. The withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq is expected to become effective by the end of 2011, and Addis Ababa announced that its mission was completed in December 2008.

Nevertheless, serious efforts are required to translate elusive intentions into tangible plans, particularly in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where Israel’s military dominance creates an imbalance in attempts to negotiate a settlement and where special diplomatic efforts are required to overcome suspicions, acts of provocation and hostilities on both sides. In the case of Iraq, the agreement between the US and the Government on the withdrawal of US troops points in the right direction. Similarly, Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Somalia sets the stage for new diplomatic initiatives.
But in all three cases, hard questions remain about the reconstruction of state institutions, society and the economy in the post-conflict phases in these countries. The Iraqi factions have yet to meet within the framework of a comprehensive political process, reconciliation efforts in Somalia are going around in circles, and the dispute between Fatah and Hamas has not been resolved. New attempts to build peace in the region should start with a fresh dialogue on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and involve neighbouring countries such as Syria. Moreover, priority must be given to removing obstacles to the development process in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. As a New York Times editorial put it: “In the West Bank, that means freezing further settlement construction and expansion. It means lifting roadblocks between Palestinian cities and towns that are not needed for security. In East Jerusalem, it means stopping the humiliating eviction of Palestinians. And in Gaza, it means expanding exceptions to the blockade to allow the import of cement and reconstruction materials.”

The situation in the region throws into strong relief the responsibility the UN must bear with regard to the fate of the countries under occupation or subject to military intervention. Yet, on the questions of Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the UN has been marginalized. On Somalia, it has once more resumed intensive efforts to restore stability and more humane conditions, which however requires the cooperation of all vested interests. The fact remains that the only impartial framework for realising human and national security in the three cases is that provided by the UN. The League of Arab States could acquire greater credibility and efficacy if it cooperates with the international organisation towards this end. However, for that to happen, global and regional powers must summon the will to leave the field open for the UN and the League of Arab States to remedy the extensive damage on the ground.
Endnotes

1 Galtung 1964.
2 Israel withdrew from Sinai in 1982 as a result of the Peace Agreement with Egypt.
3 The Knesset ratified the Golan Heights Law in December 14, 1981, extending Israeli law to the area of the Golan Heights.
7 Government of the United States 2009c.
8 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2006.
12 Government of the United Kingdom 2008.
13 Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura 2008.
17 Burnham et al. 2006.
18 Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group 2006.
21 Fischer 2006.
23 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, online database 2008.
24 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, online database 2008.
26 Data for the period 2000-2008 based on B’Tselem 2009.
27 PCBS 2008.
28 HRW 2008a.
29 HRW 2008a.
30 UN Secretary-General Report, 2008a.
31 HRW 2008a.
32 UNAMI 2008.
33 HRW 2008 (in Arabic).
34 HRW 2008b.
35 Anti-Terrorism Law, no. 13 (2005). The anti-terrorism law broadly defines terrorism as “every criminal act committed by an individual or an organized group that targeted an individual or group of individuals or groups or official or unofficial institutions and caused damage to public or private properties, with the aim to disturb the peace, stability, and national unity or to bring about horror and fear among people and create chaos to achieve terrorist goals.” As cited in the HRW report.
36 HRW 2008b.
37 HRW 2008b.
38 Ferwana 2006.
40 Amnesty International 2007a.
41 Amnesty International 2007b.
42 HRW 2008b.
43 World Bank 2008b.
45 ILO 2007.
46 Platts 2008.
49 It is difficult to supply precise statistics on institutionalized corruption in the new government agencies. However, Iraq’s Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), created after the war, reports more than 2,500 corruption cases involving a total of $18 billion. Director-generals, deputy ministers, and ministers were implicated in forty-two of these cases, some of which involved various types of smuggling. Although Iraqi courts adjudicated in some cases involving senior officials and passed sentences against the defendants, in most instances guilty parties were not taken into custody. Some were even helped to flee the country before the government could recover embezzled funds. The most serious cases of profiteering and corruption were those that took place in the petroleum sector, where investigators at the CPI and other international bodies discovered massive oil smuggling in the years following the occupation. A report by the Inspector-
General of the Ministry of Petroleum, indicates that corruption in the energy sector has cost Iraq millions of dollars, as a consequence of incomplete production records, lack of effective internal control systems, and weak organisational structures and work teams, particularly in the auditing departments. Perhaps worse, yet, is that some militias and political forces allied with tribal leaders control petroleum installations, including oil fields, pipelines, and ports, which they administer as private fiefdoms, beyond supervision by the government, international bodies, or even the occupying forces. This phenomenon has hampered any real possibility of accurately gauging the actual volume of oil exports (Salah Al-Nasrawi, in Arabic, background paper for the report).

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