

Citizenship 360° - Discrimination



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
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On average, respondents believe they are being treated equally in comparison with other citizens. Only 16% reported that they are not treated equally at all, while 53% reported they were treated equally to a medium or great extent (see **Figure 1**).

The sentiment of unequal treatment is found most salient in Lebanon (60%), Palestine (close to 50%) and Yemen (50%). The high percentage in Lebanon is driven mostly by Syrian respondents, 68% of whom believe they are not being treated equally at all or to a limited extent, compared to 54% of non-Syrians. There is no difference along gender lines. We find comparable results in the Arab Barometer,¹ which asked the same question in Waves 2 (2011), 3 (2013) and 4 (2016). In 2011, 48% of respondents reported being treated equally to

a medium or great extent. This figure increased to 55% in 2013, before dropping to 45% in 2016. Among the countries covered by Wave 4 – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia – Palestine and Lebanon led in perception of unequal treatment, a similar result to that in our survey, but the Arab Barometer also found similar attitudes in Algeria and Tunisia. Here again, there are few discernable differences between men and women's perceptions of inequality.

Figure 1



¹ See <https://www.arabbarameter.org/>


Those who feel they are being treated unfairly (a total of 2,674 respondents) were asked whether the source is gender, socio-economic status, minority status, religion, national identity, disability, or location of residence (disadvantaged). The most salient response is socio-economic status, with 55% of those who reported not being treated equally citing this as a major cause. This is followed by *“my gender or sexual preferences”*, which garnered 24% of responses, and up to 37% in Egypt and Morocco. No other category received more than 10% agreement. Discrimination based on country of origin is mostly felt in Lebanon, where 31% of the survey sample is Syrian: 90% of them reported not being treated equally, compared to 14% of non-Syrians. Iraq and Lebanon both have the highest percentage of people citing discrimination because of religious affiliation.

When asked specifically about the growth of sectarianism in the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), over 60% in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen said they are concerned to a great or medium extent. With regard to sources of tension in the

Arab region, respondents are on average less worried about the religious divide between Shia and Sunni than about the political divide between politicians. Only in Morocco and Yemen were respondents more likely to cite *“religious divide”* than either *“political divide”* or *“both of these divides”* as a source of tension.

In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), survey respondents were also asked how much they would like to have people from a certain group as neighbors. Intolerance towards people from a different religion was highest in Libya and Yemen, where 55% of respondents said they dislike or strongly dislike having people from a certain group as neighbors. In general, both countries have relatively low acceptance of diversity, with Libya also having the highest percentage saying they would not like immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors (63%). Jordanians are the most open to neighbors of a different religion, while Tunisians are the most tolerant towards people of a different race or color (see Figure 2).

Figure 2



Gender Discrimination

A full 40% of women in the sample agreed or strongly agreed with the statement *“I am treated with less respect because I am a woman”*, while 35% of women disagreed and 23% neither agreed nor disagreed. The percentage of women agreeing with this statement exceeds 50% only in Iraq and Somalia, while women in Jordan were most likely to disagree (48%). Poorer women (44%) were more likely to agree with this statement than richer women (37%).

When men were asked whether *“women in our societies are treated with less respect than men”*, 43% agreed – a slightly higher percentage than the women who reported that they feel treated with less respect (40%). The overwhelming majority of men in Iraq and Somalia, and a slight majority of men in Lebanon, reported this to be the case, similar to the pattern of responses from women.

Among all the development areas² where we asked respondents to rate progress or reversal in the last decade, gender equality emerges as the area where the highest proportion reported improvement: 38% of the total sample said that gender equality has improved in their societies, with only 19% stating that gender equality has worsened and 37% reporting that gender equality has not changed. In Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, 50% of respondents agreed that gender equality has improved, while in conflict areas like Syria (26%) and Yemen (21%), the figure is much lower. These beliefs are held equally among men and women, on average, but with significant differences across countries. In Iraq, while only 23% of men thought that gender equality has worsened, 45% of

women held that opinion. In Syria, the gap is even greater: 22% of men versus 55% of women report worsening conditions (see **Figure 3**).

There is divergence as well in terms of socio-economic status, with poor respondents more likely to believe that gender equality has worsened and rich respondents believing things have improved. Thirty-three percent of the poorest class believe things have improved, compared to 46% of the richest class. Further, while only 12% of the richest believe gender equality has worsened, 24% of the poorest believe this to be the case (see **Figure 4**).

Figure 3





Figure 4



² Including access to healthcare, educational opportunities, cleanliness of wooded areas and fields, access to and quality of electricity etc.


The top reason cited for improvement is government intervention in improving policies in this area. Some 49% of both men and women who think gender equality has improved hold this view – a figure that rises to 63% in Algeria as well as in Tunisia. Support from international actors is highlighted in Somalia (74%), while community self-organizing is acknowledged most significantly in Libya (47%), Syria (40%), Somalia (37%) and Palestine (34%).

The top cited reason for worsening conditions is traditional values gaining in importance. Fifty-three percent of both men and women who said gender equality has worsened believe this is a chief reason. In Somalia, 96% share this view, as do 63% in Egypt and 57% in Jordan. Although women were more likely to mention the resurgence of traditional values (55%), over 50% of men also agreed. The gap widens among those attributing

worsening gender equality to lack of economic opportunities, with over 50% of women, but only 23% of men, in agreement.

Similarly, when asked in what ways should women be empowered including economically, we see a greater divergence among the genders. Among men, 36% feel that women should be empowered in the home, 32% believe women should be empowered economically, 31% state that political empowerment is important, and 30% believe that women should be empowered socially. Among women, 61% feel economic empowerment is the most important, while 46% show support for social empowerment, 35% for political empowerment, and 25% for empowerment in the home (see **Figure 5**). Preferences are on average systematically shared across income groups, except that richer men were more likely than poorer men to think that women need to be economically empowered.

Figure 5



The low and stagnating labour force participation rate of women in the region, despite higher educational achievements, suggests that more economic empowerment is indeed needed. These socio-economic patterns are reflected in our survey, with women respondents more highly educated than men but not doing as well on all employment measures.

Forty percent of women have a college or university degree, compared to 32% of men; 8% have a post graduate degree, compared to 5% of men.

When it comes to employment, men are more likely to be employed full-time (22% to 15%) while women are almost twice as likely to be unemployed (33% to 18%). Furthermore, 51% of unemployed women said they are actively in search of a job, despite 70% having been unemployed for more than 12 months (as compared to 58% of unemployed men).

Unequal access to employment opportunities contributes to making women more vulnerable to financial shocks. When asked, *If your current source of income is disrupted, how long could you survive while meeting your basic needs?*, almost half of female respondents said they wouldn't be able to survive, compared to 39% of men. Yet women in our sample are not adequately covered by social protection: more men (23%) reported receiving food or financial support from the government than women (14%). Similarly, female respondents were less likely to say that they would turn to their "community" for help in the event of an emergency or safety concern (36% to 45% of men). And 27% of women said they wouldn't seek support from any of the other options, including "the government", "religious institutions", "local authorities" and "civil society organizations", compared to only 18% of men. There are no other major discrepancies across gender, which suggests that those women who are less likely to turn to their community will also not turn to any other alternatives.

Mobility has been identified as a barrier to women's participation in the labour market³ and assessment in our

survey reveals gender gaps. For example, women were more likely than men to report that local mobility is an issue: 50% said that traveling to another town, village, or neighborhood was very difficult or difficult compared to 38% of men (see **Figure 6.A**). This difference is compounded in rural areas, where 63% of women experience challenges moving around, compared to 44% of men (see **Figure 6.B**). In cities, there is a 7% difference between men and women on the issue of safety and security, with women (43%, compared to 36% of men) emphasizing that security and safety is a high priority in terms of quality of life. On the question of relocating to another city or country, women were also more likely to say that they want to but that it was not possible at the moment (16% women to 9% men). In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), 58% of male respondents said that a woman should not be allowed to travel abroad by herself compared to 40% of women, including 80% of male respondents in Jordan, 67% of male respondents in Egypt, and 60% of male respondents in Palestine. By contrast, in Lebanon and Morocco, a majority of women and men agree that women can travel alone.

Figure 6.A





Figure 6.B



3 UNDP 2019, *Gender Justice & The Law Regional Report*: “Women’s ability to work is limited by laws and traditions that require a woman to obtain permission of the husband or a male guardian to leave the home to work or travel, as sanctioned by the Yemen personal status law. The lifting of the restriction on women from holding a drivers’ license in Saudi Arabia is an example of a reform that supports women’s participation in employment.” (p. 75) https://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/Dem_Gov/gender-justice-and-the-law-study.html

ODI 2016, *Women’s economic empowerment*: “Limits on women’s mobility in the public domain also reduce women’s opportunities to access decent work, because of poor infrastructure and a lack of safe public transport, which limits women, and above all low-income women, to those jobs only in the vicinity of their home. [...] Other constraints are specific to certain contexts. For example, strong cultural restrictions limit women’s mobility outside the home in some regions, for example in South Asia or MENA.” (p. 15) <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10683.pdf>

A gender digital divide also constrains women's access to opportunities, as highlighted by the Secretary-General in the foreword of a 2019 report on gender equality in digital access.⁴ When asked about problems accessing the internet at home or on mobile devices, female respondents reported more disruptions than men, with 29% of women saying they experienced disruptions "often" compared to 22% for men. Fewer women than men reported that internet access has improved (31% to 38%). There are also differences between the genders when it comes to the purpose of internet use: women (58%) as opposed to men (47%) see the internet as important to obtaining information. Women were also more likely to think that internet access is fundamental to stay in touch with friends and family (57% versus 54%.) This suggests that the internet is

an empowering tool for women. However, women were much less likely to think it is fundamental for their work (34% versus 41%).

Finally, political empowerment is still lacking, and women in general do not feel that they have a voice in decision-making: although 50% of the sample do not believe they have any input at all into what the government does, women (58%) were more likely to hold this opinion than men (47%). In Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia, this gender gap is even wider, exceeding 15 percentage points. Yet, in the Arab Barometer Wave 4 (2016), over 50% in all Arab countries surveyed agreed that men are better at political leadership than women, including majorities of women in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia.

Disabilities

About 50% of the respondents said that society should make infrastructure accessible for the disabled, improve inclusion of the education system, and facilitate employment for the disabled. About 35% believe that subsidies should be offered to the disabled and another 19% believe in facilitating political engagement. Only 2% of those surveyed believe that concern for people living with disabilities is not a priority.

⁴ Sey, A. & Hafkin, N. (Eds). (2019). Taking stock: Data and evidence on gender equality in digital access, skills and leadership. United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society/International Telecommunications Union: Macau. "ICTs have the potential to alleviate some of the steep barriers faced by women, including illiteracy, poverty, time scarcity, barriers to mobility, and cultural and religious taboos." (p. 25) <https://www.itu.int/en/action/gender-equality/Documents/EQUALS%20Research%20Report%202019.pdf>

Citizenship 360° - Socio-economic exclusion

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To assess respondents’ income bracket, our survey asked them about their financial situation: a full quarter said they cannot afford food while another 14% said they can afford food but nothing else (see **Figure 7**). Up to 36% of respondents in Palestine and Yemen reported that they cannot afford food.


When asked about which services are of greatest importance, respondents are almost equally divided between three salient concerns, which are all basic socio-economic needs:

- Access to affordable, nutritious food (26%)
- Access to quality, relevant education (22%)
- Access to affordable, good quality healthcare (20%)

Food security is the top priority in almost all countries, both crisis and middle-income, including Yemen (41%), Tunisia (39%), Lebanon (31%), Syria (30%), Egypt (29%), Palestine (27%), and Jordan (25%). Meanwhile, respondents in Algeria and Morocco cited access to quality, relevant education as the most important service (see **Figure 8**).

Breaking down these results by income group, the poorest segments of the sample were almost 150% more likely to express concerns about access to affordable nutritious food than the richer segments. A full third of those who cannot afford food expressed this concern, which decreases as incomes rise

Figure 7



(see **Figure 9**). Richer segments were slightly more likely to prioritize access to quality healthcare and particularly access to quality education.

When asked whether access to food has changed over the last 10 years, 49% of the sample (almost half) said that access to food has worsened. Majorities of the sample in Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen reported this to be the case. A majority of the poorest segment – 53% – said that access to food has worsened, compared to 34% of the richest segment.

Figure 8





Figure 9




Inequality on the Rise

Regarding policy issues, 23% of respondents identified “*equity and equal opportunities*” as their top priority, while another 23% said “*finding and maintaining employment*” is of greatest importance. But these averages conceal different country realities: 38% of respondents in Algeria and 31% of respondents in Morocco think that addressing inequality is essential, while in Iraq, priorities are divided almost equally among poverty (23%), employment (22%), and conflict (21%). In Palestine and Lebanon, employment is seen as more important than equity (see **Figure 10**).

Figure 10



POLICY ISSUES OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO RESPONDENTS




A question on the main sources of inequality in the country reveals that respondents are feeling left behind by economic structures and policies.

Some 67% of all respondents identified income inequalities as a main source, ahead of gender or sexual preferences (31%) and geographical (e.g., urban/rural) disparities (11%). Less than 10% cited religion or ethnicity, legal citizenship status (immigrant, refugee) or disability as a source (see **Figure 11**). Perceptions of whether or not one is treated equally compared to other citizens also maps onto socio-economic class: while 10% of

richer respondents reported not being treated equally, 19% of poorer individuals revealed the same. This was not the case in Palestine and Algeria, where richer respondents were just as likely to express feelings of unequal treatment; and in Libya, where richer segments were in fact more likely to say they are not being treated equally.

Figure 11




Only 19% of respondents believe that inequality has decreased in the last 10 years. Thirty-eight percent believe it has increased, while another 35% believe it has stayed the same.

Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and Tunisia all boast levels of approximately 40% in agreeing that inequality has increased. This perception is almost equally shared across income groups and gender. In the Arab Barometer, the percentage of people who thought they are not being treated equally at all compared to other citizens has increased between 2011 and 2016 in all countries surveyed except for Lebanon, where the 2011 figure was already very high (55%). Over this period, the percentage increased in Algeria from 23% to 27%, in Egypt from 16% to 28%, in Jordan from 14% to 20%, in Palestine from 22% to 35%, and in Tunisia from 27% to

60%, the largest increase. In our survey, those who believed that inequality has increased – a total of 2,553 respondents – blame cronyism (see Figure 12), including the fact that “well-paid employment opportunities are accessible only through connections,” “corruption/crime has increased” and “national elites are grabbing increasing amount of resources”. The first statement was highlighted strongly in Egypt (65%), Jordan (62%) and Morocco (59%), while the rise of corruption and crime was cited by majorities in three crisis countries, Libya (71%), Somalia (57%), and Yemen (50%).


Figure 12



When asked to evaluate how the situation has evolved over the past decade in different development areas, including educational opportunities, cleanliness of the environment, infrastructure, and access to electricity, poorer respondents were consistently more likely to say that things have worsened


(see **Figure 13**) and less likely to say that they have improved. The gap in assessment was particularly wide on the subjects of employment opportunities, healthcare, access to food, and education.

Figure 13



Poverty on the Rise

Figure 14



Although eradication of poverty did not emerge as a priority policy area in our survey (see Figure 10), assessments about how poverty levels have evolved in the last decade indicate that a full majority - 58% - believes that they have increased.

This opinion is strongest in conflict states like Yemen (85%), Syria (77%), and Palestine (62%), but is higher than average also in Lebanon (64%) and Jordan (67%). It is shared among various income levels: 61% of the poor believe that poverty has increased, while a similar number of two more affluent categories also hold this view (categories 3 and 4). This finding of non-poor categories 3 and 4 appears to hold true in most countries (see Figure 14). On average, 49% of the very richest segment share this view as well, which is considerably lower than the 61% among the poor, but there are exceptions: among respondents from the highest socio-economic class, 88% in Yemen, 71% in Libya, and 63% in Lebanon believe that poverty has increased. Curiously, those in the second-lowest income category, who can afford food but nothing else, share a similar

assessment as the very rich in our sample, with only 51% saying that poverty has increased. This result is driven by a very small percentage of respondents in this income category from a few countries: only 21% in Algeria, 33% in Iraq, 36% in Morocco, and 30% of the second income category in Somalia reported that poverty has increased.


The 3,909 respondents who believe poverty is on the rise were asked about the reasons behind this. Sixty percent blamed the lack of employment opportunities (see Employment section), including over 60% of respondents in Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Somalia, and Syria. The second most-cited reason, “global economic uncertainty”, garnered only 33% of responses.

Social Protection

Nineteen percent of respondents have received food or financial subsidies in the last 12 months. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria boast the highest percentage receiving assistance and subsidies, with 33%, 34%, and 43%, respectively. On average, subsidy mechanisms seem to be skewed towards the more affluent: 20% of the richest segment of the sample report

receiving subsidies, compared to only 17% of the poorest segment (see Figure 15). This result is driven by a few countries, such as Iraq, where 48% of the richest segment report receiving food or financial assistance, compared to 30% of the poorest segment. This observation also holds in Palestine, Somalia, Yemen and to a lesser extent in Jordan.

Figure 15



Of those receiving support, 71% receive it in the form of food subsidies, making it the primary form of assistance. This result is particularly salient in conflict areas: in Syria (93%), Yemen (81%), and Iraq (74%), but also in middle-income countries like Egypt (79%) and Lebanon (74%). Fuel subsidies are most prominent in Libya (35%) and Tunisia (29%), while housing was

received by around a fifth of those receiving assistance in Algeria and Libya.

Of those receiving assistance, 47% reported that the help, along with other sources of income, is sufficient to cover household expenditures. However, this was the case for only 30% in Yemen and Jordan, and only 9% in Syria.


Health Services

Sixty-one percent of respondents said that they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with health care services nearby. This pattern is compounded for poorer people (see **Figure 16**) and is fairly uniform across countries, with two countries tilting in a more positive direction.

Fifty-three percent of respondents in Egypt and 60% in Jordan reported satisfaction with local health care. Majorities in all the other countries reported their dissatisfaction. In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), a similar question was asked but in more general terms – “satisfaction with the health care system in the country” – and a comparable share of respondents said they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied: the average across Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen is 62%, with the highest levels of satisfaction found in Jordan (64% said they were very satisfied or satisfied).


Only 17% of respondents indicated that access to health care (for oneself and family) has improved in the last 10 years. Forty-two percent believe it is the same as it was a decade earlier, while 36% believe that it has worsened over that period. Somalia boasts the strongest sentiment of improvement, with 36% saying that health care has improved in the last decade – but this may be somewhat attributable to the fact that a decade earlier, Somalia was mired in a civil war.

Figure 16



Among the poorest segment, 40% believe health care has worsened, compared to 20% among the richest segment. The lack of public investment is the most-cited reason (46%) for the worsening perception of access to health care services, with some significant divergences across countries: up to 94% in Somalia, but only 15% in Yemen. A close second reason is the lack of qualified personnel (45%). In a few countries, respondents were just as likely or even more likely to cite the lack of private health care options as compared to public investment: in Syria, 66% for the former versus 56% for the latter; in Yemen, 22% versus 15%; and in Egypt, 44% versus 42%. In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), respondents reported varying degrees of trust in private hospitals: in Egypt, 61% of respondents expressed *“a great deal of trust”* or *“quite a lot of trust”*, while in Libya, only 27% could say the same. Majorities in Algeria (53%), Iraq (54%), Lebanon (57%), and Tunisia (51%) said they do not trust private hospitals very much or at all.

Figure 17




Affordability is a barrier to receiving health care for our respondents, especially poorer ones: 22% said they could not get medical advice because it was too expensive, including 21% of the poor and 14% of the most affluent segments (see **Figure 17**). This pattern was worse in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Morocco, where close to a quarter of respondents cited unaffordability. More worryingly, 37% said they did not get the medical treatment they needed because it was too expensive. Some 45% of the poorest segment said this, compared to

19% of the richest. More than 40% of the respondents in Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and Yemen reported this to be the case, with Lebanon being the highest, at 48%. In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), majorities in Algeria (56%), Egypt (69%), Iraq (56%), Lebanon (67%), Morocco (64%), and Yemen (54%), said that paying a *rashwa* is somewhat or highly necessary to receive better health care services, suggesting that even if health care services are provided for free, the true cost might not be.

Education

Figure 18




Educational attainment tracks income level in our sample: 60% of those in the richest segments have completed tertiary education, with 45% holding a college or university degree and an additional 15% a post-graduate degree. Only 8% listed

primary school as the highest education level they have achieved. By contrast, 18% of the poorest segment said this was the case and only 30% have tertiary education, a twofold difference (see **Figure 18**).

Sixty-two percent of respondents reported that there are children in the household receiving education, and the majority of these children attend public schools (68%). Some 22% attend paid private schools, 7% free private schools, and 3% international private schools (see Figure 19).


Figure 19



In Algeria, Iraq, Palestine, and Tunisia, close to 80% of children in respondents' households attend public schools. In Somalia, 62% of children attend a local paid private school, while 8% attend an international private school, an indication that the sample might be skewed towards affluent Somalis. Indeed, school type is heavily influenced by income. Whereas 75% of the poorest segment of the sample attend public schools, only 44% of the richest segments do so. Conversely, while 18% of the poorest segments attend fee-based private schools (local or international), 51% of the richest segments (an approximate threefold increase) opt for this education choice.

Forty-four percent of respondents with children in school are satisfied with the education received, with 54% saying they are dissatisfied. Levels of satisfaction are highest in Palestine, Lebanon, and Somalia. Levels of dissatisfaction are highest in Yemen, Morocco, and Iraq. But majorities reported dissatisfaction in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia as well.

Figure 20



Both income and type of school attended play a critical role in determining levels of satisfaction (see Figure 20).

Those with children in international private school reported 70% satisfaction rates. Similarly, those whose children attend local paid private school reported 59% satisfaction rates while in contrast, 61% of those whose children are in public school said they are (very) dissatisfied. And since school attendance

is correlated with affluence, as mentioned above, richer segments are more satisfied (63%) and less dissatisfied (37%), while poorer respondents are more dissatisfied (60%) and less satisfied (40%).

When asked how education could be improved, 55% cited “*more qualified teachers*”, 38% said “*more tools and better curricula*”, and 35% said “*smaller class sizes*”.

Only 3% said no improvement is needed. These findings hold across gender and income groups, albeit with notable variation across countries. A clear majority in Syria wants to see more qualified teachers/professors (75%), with Libya coming in second at 62%. Lebanon sees the lowest support for this at 37%, although this is still the top choice, almost equal to “more tools and better curricula”, at 36%. On the issue of more tools and better curricula, Libya has the highest percentage, at 52%, while the rest of the Arab countries are within the 30-43% range of support.

Of the students taking the survey, 57% reported attending public university, 18% private university, 14% technical/vocational, and 12% “*other*”, mostly referring to secondary school. Algeria has the highest percentage of students in public schools, at 79%, while Somalia has the lowest, at 35%. Conversely, Somalia has the highest enrollment in private universities (49%), followed by Palestine, at 34%. Based on the average among the 12 countries surveyed, there is no apparent correlation with income as has been observed with children’s school type: richest segments (56%) are just as likely to attend public universities as the poorest segments (57%). However, in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen, richer students are slightly more likely to attend private institutions. In Lebanon for example, 23% of the poorest segment attend private university, versus 43% of the richest segment.

A near-majority of students (48%) reported being dissatisfied with the education they are receiving, with 52% saying they are satisfied. Income plays a factor here, with richer respondents more satisfied. Students in Lebanon have the highest levels of satisfaction at 67%, with Jordan and Palestine coming

in at second at 63%. Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen have the highest levels of dissatisfaction. Levels of satisfaction are driven by type of university. Students enrolled in private universities are far more satisfied than those in public universities and those in technical or vocational training. Some 66% of those in private universities reported satisfaction, while 47% of those in public universities said the same.

Among students, having qualified teachers is the primary concern at 50%, followed by better tools for the curricula (40%), and relevant skills (30%). Having qualified teachers is a top concern for a majority in Somalia (73%), Syria (73%), Algeria (56%) and Jordan (53%), while commute distance is an issue for more than a quarter of respondents in Jordan, Libya, and Lebanon.

The Arab Barometer Wave 5 asks a more general question about satisfaction with the educational system. Around 57% of respondents said they are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, a higher percentage than in our survey. But there are similar country patterns, with Palestine and Jordan reporting the highest levels of satisfaction (66% and 61%, respectively), and respondents overall reporting more satisfaction with education than health. Yet with respect to trust in private universities, there are major differences across countries: 75% of Arab Barometer respondents in Yemen, 60% in Palestine, and 50% in Lebanon said they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust. Conversely, in Libya, only 19% said the same, with an overwhelming 54% saying they have no trust at all. In Algeria, 36% reported not knowing how to answer, with more saying they do not trust private universities (38%) than those saying they do (26%).

Of all respondents, only 17% reported that educational opportunities have improved in the last 10 years. A full 34% said things have worsened, and 42% said it has stayed the same. There were no significant differences across gender. Disparities do exist across income, however, with 30% of the wealthiest segments reporting improvements compared to 15% of the poorest segments. The highest levels of improvement are seen in Somalia, at 50%. In most other countries, the assessment does not exceed 25%.

Disruption of Education

A full 28% of the sample reported that the education of children in their household has been disrupted in the last 12 months, with significant variation between countries. Among respondents, 65% in Syria, 44% in Libya, 39% in Yemen and Tunisia, 27% in Lebanon (with 34% of Syrians in Lebanon reporting this to be the case and 24% of non-Syrians in Lebanon), and 27% in Morocco reported that the education of children in their household has been disrupted. Somalia sees the smallest percentage reporting disruption, at 6%, followed by Jordan, at 9%. This pattern is also based on income, with 30% the lowest socio-economic segment reporting disruption as compared to 16% of the wealthiest. This appears to be correlated with the type of school children attend: 15% of those in international private school reported having their education disrupted, as compared with 19% of those in local paid private school, 27% of those in local free private school, and 31% of those in public school.

When asked why their education has been disrupted, **“strikes”** and **“shortage or absence of teachers”** were cited as the top reasons, together accounting for 35% of responses. These seem to be significant problems particularly in North Africa, as cited by 60% in Algeria, 68% in Morocco, and 67% in Tunisia.

Among those who believe matters have improved, the highest ranked reason is **“government efforts”** (54%). Among those who believe matters are worsening, 47% cited **“lack of public investments”**, with another 32% mentioning **“lack of private education options”**. Across countries, clear majorities in Libya, Morocco, Somalia, and Tunisia mentioned lack of public investment, while in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria, over 40% of those who believe matters are worsening think that a lack of private education options is to blame.

Financial reasons (inability to afford education) affect majorities in Jordan (69%), Iraq (53%), and Lebanon (51%). In Libya, the main reasons are all conflict-related: **“Damage to school infrastructure”** (38%), war and conflict (35%), and **“Forced to relocate”** (31%). Similarly, in Syria, 73% of those with children experiencing education disruption said it was because they have been forced to relocate.

Among students, 36% reported that their education has been disrupted in the last 12 months. While there is no difference along gender lines, income plays a critical role, with 41% of the poorest segment saying their education has been disrupted and 24% of the richest segment reporting the same. School type also is correlated to disruption in education provision, with 38% of those in public universities reporting disruption, versus 29% of those in private universities.

Countries that have witnessed protests and conflict show the highest levels of disruption: 48% of respondent students in Algeria, 44% in Lebanon, 63% in Libya, 70% in Syria, 45% in Tunisia, and 46% in Yemen. Somalia and Egypt reported the lowest levels of disruption, with 9% and 12% respectively saying their education has been disrupted.

Employment

On the issue of employment, when asked, *Which of the following employment issues is of greatest concern to you?*, a full 40% of respondents indicated that the lack of job opportunities because of economic crisis or uncertainty is a primary concern. This response is particularly salient for the poorer segments of the sample and declines as income rises (see **Figure 21**). Some 28% of respondents cited lack of job opportunities due to corruption in the hiring process; another 17% cited underpayment for available opportunities, 7% cited barriers to career development, and another 7% stated that employment is not a concern. Underpayment of opportunities is the top issue in Egypt (32%), while over 50% of respondents in Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen are concerned about the lack of jobs. Over a third of those surveyed in Iraq and Morocco cited corruption in the hiring process (see **Figure 22**).

Figure 21





Figure 22



A full 62% of the sample said that employment opportunities have worsened in the last 10 years – the worst assessment among all development areas – with only 11% saying things have improved. There is significant variation across countries. Somalia has the highest assessments of improvement, where about a quarter (24%) of the respondents indicated that things have improved, while 19% in Egypt said the same. A full 85% of respondents in Yemen said that employment opportunities have worsened in the last 10 years, followed by 82% of respondents in Syria, 73% in Palestine, 71% in Lebanon, 67% in Jordan, 66% in Tunisia, and 63% in Iraq. Further, poorer segments of the sample are more likely to believe that this is the case, with 67% stating that employment problems have worsened, as opposed to 47% for the richest segment of the sample.

Among the 62% of the sample that perceive worsening employment opportunities, increasing corruption was most commonly cited as a reason (43%) – more than double the second-most popular response of global economic uncertainty (19%). Country-specific circumstances drive diversified perceptions on this topic. Majorities in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia emphasized that corruption is a

primary reason behind worsening employment opportunities. Significant segments of the sample blamed armed conflict (15%), with higher rates of attribution in conflict countries such as Libya (44%), Syria (32%), and Yemen (46%). Lack of public investment in innovation, industry and infrastructure (16% overall) was cited particularly often in Somalia (62%) and Syria (29%). The influx of refugees (6% overall) was highlighted mostly in two countries: Lebanon (27%) and Jordan (22%), although in both countries, corruption remains the most reported reason for the worsening of employment opportunities (34% and 47%, respectively).


With the exception of Egypt and Morocco, majorities of respondents in the Arab Barometer think that *wasta* (getting a job through connections) happens often. Respondents in Jordan, Iraq and Tunisia were particularly likely to say so, at 79%, 79%, and 75%, respectively. Answers are not strongly correlated with income; even though those in the bottom socio-economic group were 13% more likely to say that it happens often than those in the top socio-economic group, there are no major differences across the top three (out of four) socio-economic groups.

Employment Status of Respondents

Nineteen percent of the sample reported being employed full-time, 11% part-time, and 13% self-employed. Thirty percent of the sample stated they are students, including 5% who are working part-time. Another 24% are unemployed. Examining employment patterns by income reveals that those who are more comfortable in the labor market (full-time, and


self-employed) are also those who are better off: of those in the richest category, 31% reported being employed full-time, compared to 10% among the poorest segment (see **Figure 23**). Those who are unemployed are worse off (with 38% of the poorest segment unemployed, compared only to 13% of the richest class).

Figure 23



Most interesting to note is that students are struggling economically more than non-students. This is both positive and negative. It shows that educational access is available to poorer segments of the population – but are there jobs to absorb these students after graduation? Will education lead to better employment opportunities? Or will it add to the ranks of skilled unemployment?


Figure 24A



When asked how confident students are about securing employment after studies, only 27% reported that they are confident or very confident, with 73% saying they are not very confident or not confident at all (see **Figure 24A**). These responses are correlated with income, with 48% of the richest segment reporting they are confident or very confident they would find employment, and only 25%, almost

half of the poorest group, saying the same. Those already employed are slightly more optimistic, with 41% reporting that they are confident or very confident that they would still have a job in 12 months. This is again correlated with income: richer respondents were more likely to feel confident (see **Figure 24B**).

Figure 24B



Of those unemployed, 64% reported that they are searching for a job, while 24% reported that they are full-time homemakers (including 39% of unemployed women). A full 65% reported being unemployed for more than 12 months, and longer durations are correlated with income: 67% of the poorest unemployed respondents, compared to 55% of the richest segment, have been out of a job for more than 12 months. Across countries, 81% of the unemployed in Palestine have been so for more than a year, as well as 78% of the unemployed in Yemen and 74% of the unemployed in Libya. Only in Somalia have a majority of the unemployed been without a job for a year or less.


Among employed respondents, 33% reported that their physical safety is at risk because of their work, with respondents in Lebanon and Syria reporting the highest levels (at 46% and 44% respectively). Those with lower incomes

reported more risk (41%) than the richest segment (28%). Some 35% of the sample also reported that their health is at risk because of their employment; 40% or more of respondents in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen expressed health risks in their employment – with respondents in Lebanon expressing the highest risk, at 47%. These risk assessments are pretty comparable across genders, with men expressing slightly higher risk assessments. Since informal and low-skilled employment are more likely to be dangerous, these answers may hint at the type of jobs in which respondents are employed.

Job-provided medical insurance coverage is generally low for those employed, with 44% of respondents saying they are not covered at all. Fourteen percent said their employer is paying for insurance, 16% said medical insurance is provided through work but not paid for, and 26% said they are receiving public health insurance.

About a third of the employed in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan rely on public insurance, as do 50% in Algeria (see **Figure 25**). Furthermore, 50% of those employed are ineligible for maternity or paternity benefits (45% of women and 31% of men).

Figure 25



Information Technology

When asked about how often respondents have had problems accessing the internet at home or on mobile devices, 10% said never, 24% rarely, 37% sometimes, and 25% often. Poorer people reported more interruptions. A third of respondents said they experience frequent interruptions in Iraq, Palestine, and Yemen.

Overall, 35% or respondents reported that access to the internet has improved in the past two years, while 20% said it has worsened, and 40% said it has stayed the same. In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Somalia, more than 40% of respondents say that internet access has improved. Poorer people were almost twice as likely to say that internet access has worsened: 26%, as compared to 13% among the richest segment. While 47% of the richest said access has improved, only 29% of the poorest said the same.

When asked the main role of internet and information technologies in their lives, 55% said it is fundamental to stay in touch with family and friends, 52% cited it as the best way of obtaining information, and 38% said it is fundamental for work. Only 5% said it is important in staying politically active, with the highest percentage in Libya (14%). There are few differences across income groups on these responses, with the exception of using the internet for work: 57% of the richest segment reported using it for work, as compared to 30% of the poorest segment. In Egypt, close to 50% said it is important for work; the rest of the countries are around 40%. Palestine (27%) and Yemen (28%) have the lowest levels, which is probably indicative of the general labor market in each country.

Citizenship 360° - Spatial exclusion

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Forty-six percent of respondents live in cities, 14% in rural areas, and 40% in suburbs. Place of origin within the country (e.g. urban/rural, capital city/remote area) was cited by only 11% of respondents as a source of inequality, including 16% of rural dwellers and 8% of urban residents. However, this figure is higher in rural areas of Libya (25%), Tunisia (23%), Algeria (23%) and Morocco (21%), but close to the average in Syria (15%). Similarly, 10% of those who feel they are being treated unequally

attributed it to their being from a disadvantaged area of the country – with higher numbers in Syria (20%), Morocco (15%), and Algeria (14%). In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), a full 29% rated the government's performance on limiting economic disparity between the regions as very bad, with another 37% rating it as bad. In Lebanon, 51% felt the government is doing a very bad job on this, while 34% of respondents in Iraq and 32% of those in Tunisia said the same.

Rural-Urban Divide

Geographical location is not completely correlated with income, although on average those in rural areas are more likely to be unable to afford food (33%), compared to those in either cities or suburbs (around 25% of each are in the lowest socio-economic class). In other income segments, there are no significant differences. Correlation is more evident in some countries: in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, a higher percentage of respondents live in cities and belong to the upper two socio-economic segments, while a higher percentage in rural areas are struggling to make ends meet. Rural inhabitants also seem to be more vulnerable to financial shocks, with almost half of them claiming they would not be able to survive disruption to their source of income. In urban areas, this figure is 39%.

There are spatial inequalities in educational attainment: more highly educated respondents are clustered in cities, where 38% of respondents hold a university degree and 8% a post-graduate diploma. In rural areas, 27% have a university degree, while 17% have only primary education. But this is not the case in all countries. In Iraq, Morocco and Syria, there is no strong correlation between education and location. In Algeria, rural respondents are actually more likely to have completed tertiary education (57%, versus 49% in cities). A greater share of rural respondents reported disruptions in the past year of either their own education or that of children in their households.

Little divergence is observed on priority policy issues. Among those living in rural areas, 34% said that food security is important, as compared to 25% in cities – a figure likely influenced by the higher percentage in rural areas who cannot afford food. In general, on assessments of progress or reversal, there are few significant differences across locations. Exceptions include the 27% of rural dwellers who said that access to internet has worsened in the last two years (compared to 18% of urban dwellers), and the 29% in rural areas reporting worsening access to clean water and sanitation in the last decade, as compared to 21% in cities.

Among the employed, those living in rural areas were more likely to say that their physical safety and health are at risk because of their work, suggesting greater precarity of work-place conditions in rural areas (see Figure 26). However, those in rural areas are better covered by medical insurance, including 19% covered by their employers, as compared to 11% in urban areas.

A quarter of rural respondents have solicited police support in the past year, compared to a fifth of those living in cities, and are more likely to have been very dissatisfied with the support received (38% versus 29%). Surprisingly, 42% said that government at both national and local levels is responsive to their needs, while only 31% in urban areas concurred.


Quality of Life in Cities

The top quality-of-life issue for urban respondents is safety and security, with 38% of respondents expressing this concern. Access to housing (15%) and air quality (15%) are the immediate subsequent concerns. Every country surveyed listed safety and security as the prime concern except for Algeria, where 35% cited access to housing as a primary concern, and Lebanon, where 31% listed air quality as the main concern; in Jordan, 22% said that quality of life in cities is not a concern to them, followed by air quality (20%), and then safety and security in third place. There is not much difference across income groups in ranking the options, which included access to housing, air quality, public transportation, waste management, and urban planning.

Quality of Life in Rural Areas

In rural areas, concerns are different. There, 22% said the environment⁵ is their top concern and another 20% cited economic opportunities. This pattern of citing environmental and economic concerns as primary and/or secondary concerns holds generally across all countries: respondents in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen listed these as primary. Waste management is a priority in Somalia (61%), and to a certain extent in Egypt (21%) and Syria (18%). Libya is the only country to strongly highlight quality of public services (31%). And Algeria lists economic opportunities first, with quality of housing second. Similarly, across gender and income groups, economic opportunities and environmental concerns are most often cited as primary and/or secondary concerns. Poorer segments of the population were more likely

Figure 26




Only about a quarter of the surveyed population (26%) believe that life in cities has improved; 32% said it has worsened, and another 34% believe that things have stayed the same over the last decade. Positive assessment far surpasses this figure in Algeria (where 40% say quality of life has improved), Morocco (39%), and Somalia (43%). Opinions appear constant among rich and poor, although the rich were more likely to say that things have improved (34%, as compared to 25% of poor respondents).

to identify the environment as an issue (25% of respondents from the lowest income bracket versus 14% from the highest) and quality of housing (13% versus 2%).

Twenty-nine percent of respondents believe that life has improved in rural areas in the last 10 years. However, 30% believe that things have worsened and 37% believe rural areas are the same as they were 10 years ago. There are great differences across countries, with over half of rural respondents in Egypt saying that quality of life has improved, while in conflict countries Libya and Syria, the figure is around 3%. Across socio-economic status, richer respondents were much more likely to see improvement (49%, as compared with 22% of poorer respondents).

⁵ Note in the Arab Barometer 5th wave, rural residents were more likely than urban residents to cite climate change as serious problem (39% rural; 34% urban)


Figure 27



Nineteen percent of city dwellers, 40% of rural inhabitants, and 30% of suburbanites reported living in an informal settlement or slum (see **Figure 27**). Thirty percent of respondents in the lowest income group and 37% of the second-lowest income group reported living in slums or informal settlements. Only 10% of the richest segment of the sample reported the

same and those are mostly concentrated in Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Conflict areas Iraq (43%) and Syria (42%) reported the highest percentages, with Yemen, Palestine, and Lebanon each reporting about a third of the sample living in informal settlements or slums. Tunisia and Morocco reported close to 28% in each country.

Figure 28



The acceleration of urbanization is giving rise to a widening urban-urban divide, in which living conditions in slums and wealthier neighborhoods of the same city can differ greatly. In our survey, both sets of inhabitants in formal and informal settlements in urban settings share similar quality of life priorities: both groups cited safety and security as the number one priority, followed by air quality and access to housing. Notable differences however do emerge between inhabitants

of formal and informal settlements on the degree of their access to specific services. For example, those in informal settlements were more concerned about the lack of electricity infrastructure, more likely to mention the difficulty in accessing safe drinking water, health care, internet, and travel to other towns, and more likely to report that their children's education had been disrupted (see **Figure 28**). They also were more likely to say quality of life has worsened in the last 10 years.

Safety, Mobility and Infrastructure


Fifty-six percent of respondents feel their neighborhood is safe for themselves and their families, with richer people slightly more likely to agree. Overall, 23% disagree, including more than 60% disagreeing in Syria. By contrast, close to 80% of respondents in Jordan expressed feelings of safety. Among middle-income countries, Morocco has the highest percentage of people concerned about safety, with 21% of respondents either strongly disagreeing or disagreeing with the statement, the same figure as in crisis countries like Iraq and Yemen. In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), somewhat similar patterns resulted from a question about personal and family safety and security. In Jordan, 91% responded that safety and security is “*fully ensured*” or “*ensured*”. A greater percentage in Morocco and Tunisia than in Iraq said they were not safe. Lebanon stood out in the Arab Barometer survey: 45% said their safety is not ensured, while only 15% in our survey of respondents in Lebanon expressed sentiments of insecurity.

Forty-three percent of respondents reported that it is difficult to travel to another town, village, or neighborhood, while 57% reported that it is easy.

Perceptions differ widely between crisis countries and middle-income countries, with around 70% in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia saying that local mobility is not an issue. Respondents in Lebanon were as likely as those in Iraq to say that their ability to travel is constrained.

Poorer people similarly reported more difficulty with local mobility. While 50% of poorer respondents said it is difficult, only 25% of the rich reported the same (see **Figure 29**). Finally, those residing in rural areas also reported more difficulty getting around (51%, as compared to 46% in suburban areas and 37% in cities). Among those who reported difficulty with local mobility, the expense of travel (55%) and security (50%) were cited as the most prominent obstacles. Affordability of travel is an issue across all countries but especially in Somalia (91%), Syria (65%), Jordan (64%), and Egypt (60%) while security is mainly a concern in crisis countries Syria (90%), Libya (73%), and Yemen (66%). Lack of public transportation is not a significant barrier to

Figure 29



mobility in general (17%), with certain exceptions in North Africa – Libya (32%), Tunisia (26%), and Algeria (25%).

Satisfaction with public transportation is quite evenly split: 47% are satisfied, while 53% are dissatisfied. Over 60% of respondents in Algeria and Egypt are satisfied. The poorer are slightly more dissatisfied than the rich (56%, versus 47%, reporting being very dissatisfied or dissatisfied) and rural residents more than urban residents (59% versus 50%). Twenty-eight percent believe that public transportation has improved in the last decade, while 34% believe it has stayed the same. Another 33% believe public transportation has worsened. Improvement is attributed to the private sector and government in roughly equal measure (about 40% each), while 69% cited lack of public investment as the most salient reason for worsening conditions.


On infrastructure more generally, including communication technology and industry, 33% of those surveyed believe that it has improved, while 27% believe it has worsened and 35% find it unchanged. More than half of respondents in Egypt and Jordan noted improvement. The poorer class is slightly more likely to believe that the infrastructure has worsened (27%, as compared to 20% of rich respondents).

Migration

When asked whether they have thought about moving or relocating, only 30% of respondents said no. Some 36% said that they have considered moving to another country, while 9% said they would relocate within the country; 12% said they have considered moving or relocating, but it is not possible at the moment; and another 12% said they do not know. Respondents

in Lebanon (47%, including the 70% of Syrians living in Lebanon), Jordan (42%), Palestine (40%), Yemen (39%), and Somalia (39%) expressed the highest desires to emigrate from their countries. Unsurprisingly, rural inhabitants are more likely to contemplate relocating within the country (16% versus 7% of urban dwellers, including a third of Iraq's rural respondents).

Figure 30



There is a clear socio-economic pattern, with richer respondents more likely than poorer segments to say they would not consider moving or relocating (see **Figure 30**). In fact, 56% of respondents who indicated they would like to move mentioned that they would do so because they could make more money somewhere else – this is true for 63-64% in Egypt, Jordan, Somalia and, Tunisia. The lack of opportunities as a driver for migration was highlighted by majorities in Palestine and Somalia. Even in conflict areas like Libya, Syria,

and Yemen, economic motivations are just as or more important than concerns related to violence. Asked about destinations, 45% of respondents indicated that they would like to move to Europe, 17% said a city within their own country, and another 12% mentioned North America. In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), results were comparable: a third of respondents said they had contemplated emigration from their country; 59% said it would be for economic reasons, and 51% mentioned Europe as a destination.

Citizenship 360° - Shocks and fragility

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
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Climate Change

Some 55% of respondents said they were personally affected by one or several natural disaster events in the past year, including floods (13%), drought (15%), and extreme weather (24%). A third of respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria mentioned extreme weather, while a third of Somalis said

they have experienced drought. Some 30% of respondents in Iraq and Tunisia have endured floods. Majorities in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Somalia said they have not been affected by any event. Those living in rural areas were more likely to have been affected – 60%, compared to 52% in cities.

Figure 31



Thirty-one percent said the impact of natural disasters has increased in the past decade – twice the percentage who thought it has decreased – with the highest percentages in Libya and Somalia (50%), followed by 45% in Tunisia. Yet 24% of respondents said they are not concerned with climate change, with another 32% saying they are only a little concerned, adding up to more than 50%. Thirty percent stated that they are

concerned, while only 15% are extremely concerned. Countries like Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen were more likely to express a lack of concern, while Somalia expressed the greatest levels of concern, with 77% concerned or extremely concerned (see **Figure 31**). There are no clear income or geographical location patterns; poorer people are just as likely to be concerned about climate change as richer ones.

Somewhat conflicting results came out of a similar question in the Arab Barometer Wave 5, where respondents were asked to evaluate the severity of climate change as a problem: 35% said that it is very serious, 30% said it is somewhat serious, and only 10% said it is not at all a serious issue. The greatest levels of concern are found in Lebanon, Algeria and Jordan. Results did not differ significantly between urban and rural samples, or between samples below and above the median.

Fifty-one percent of respondents believe governments are doing too little to protect vulnerable populations from climate change.

Majorities in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen hold this view. Further, this perception is equally strong among both rich and poorer respondents alike and among those living in cities, suburbs and in rural areas.

Questions related to climate change are among those in our survey with the highest shares of respondents who did not know how to answer – about 20% on the question about impact as well as on the question about government's role. Of those who answered *"I don't know"* to either question, 45% said they are not receiving enough information on climate change and natural disasters, with the perceived lack of reliable information strongest in Somalia (70%), Yemen (58%), Libya (58%), and Iraq (55%). Richer segments were more likely to say they are informed but that the information is inconclusive (31%, versus 23% of the lowest socio-economic group).

Environment, Natural Resources and Access to Water and Electricity

Sixty-three percent of respondents believe that rivers, lakes, oceans, and seas in their area are unclean, with similar assessments in rural and urban areas. Majorities in every country, with the exception of Jordan (49%), Algeria (48%), and Morocco (46%) share this perception.

Poorer respondents were more likely to hold this view, with 24% of the bottom socio-economic group describing waters as *"very unclean"* compared to 16% of the top group. In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), over 70% of respondents in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen described water pollution as a very serious problem, a view shared by majorities in other Arab countries surveyed.

Forty percent of respondents believe that cleanliness has worsened in the last decade. Only 16% cited improvement. Majorities in Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen emphasized

worsening conditions, while North African countries Morocco and Algeria mentioned the most improvement, at 31% and 28% respectively. This pattern is not found in other North African countries such as Tunisia (13%) and Egypt (23%).


Respondents have slightly more positive assessments about wooded areas and fields, finding not only that they are cleaner than the water bodies, but also that their cleanliness has improved. Fifty-seven percent find them unclean, while 43% described these areas as clean or very clean. Majorities in Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco stated that these land areas are clean. There is variation across income categories, with poorer respondents describing less cleanliness in their areas (22% of poorer segments, as compared to 14% of richer, describing land areas as very unclean). Twenty percent pointed to improving conditions in terms of cleanliness of land areas, with 35% saying things have worsened.

Access to basic services like clean water is structured by socio-economic status and geographical location. While 40% of richer respondents reported that they never had a problem accessing safe drinking water, only 25% of poorer respondents could report the same (see Figure 32).

Similarly, while 33% of city dwellers reported never having a problem, that figure falls to 25% among rural and suburban respondents. Those living in informal settlements are disadvantaged as well, with only 19% saying “never”, compared to 33% of respondents in formal housing. This disadvantage is greatest in urban settings, where the difference between formal and informal housing on access to water is 20 percentage points. There are also discrepancies across countries: 50% of respondents in Somalia, and 42% in Jordan and Morocco reported no difficulty in access, while only 2% of those in Syria could say the same.


Similarly, a quarter of the poorest class said that access to clean water and sanitation has worsened, compared to 14% of the richest class. A fifth of the poorest segment said that access to clean water and sanitation has improved, compared

Figure 32



to 27% of the richest segment. The rural-urban divide is also present, with 29% of rural respondents citing worsening conditions, compared to 21% of those in metropolitan areas. Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen all have at least a quarter of respondents saying that access to clean water and sanitation has worsened, while around a third of respondents in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco said access has improved in the last decade (see Figure 33). In Egypt, government policies were overwhelmingly credited for this (59%); 30% also pointed to the role of local authorities. Meanwhile, respondents everywhere who thought access has deteriorated were more likely to blame the lack of public investment (62%), rather than the lack of private investment (27%).

Figure 33



— Energy and Electricity

The price of electricity is a critical issue. In all middle-income countries, the percentage concerned about affordability surpasses 40%, with respondents in Jordan being the most concerned, at 67%, followed by those in Egypt, at 62%.

Price concerns are almost equally shared among all income groups, and among both rural and urban respondents. The second priority is the complete lack of access to energy, cited by 22% but mostly driven by high percentages in conflict countries. Awareness about renewable energy is generally low, with the exception of Algeria, where a quarter cited the lack of renewable alternatives as a concern.

Comparing access to water with that of electricity, a higher percentage of respondents believe electricity access is currently worse (38%) than those that believe water access

is worse (23%). This assessment is correlated with income: 40% of poorer segments believe that access to and quality of electricity has worsened in the last 10 years, while this is true for only 25% of richer segments (see **Figure 34**). There is no significant difference between the rural and urban samples. Morocco and Egypt stand out in terms of percentage who think provision of electricity has improved, at 37% and 35% respectively. Majorities in both countries credited government policies for the improvement and a quarter in each also said local authorities addressed this issue.

Resilience to Financial and Other Shocks

Respondents’ ability to weather financial shocks appears to be limited: when asked, *If your current source of income is disrupted, how long could you survive while meeting your basic needs?*, a full 42% said they would not be able to survive at all, while about another 50% said they would not be able to survive for more than half a year (see **Figure 35A**). Majorities

in Jordan (50%), Lebanon (52%), Palestine (57%), and Yemen (52%) said that they wouldn’t be able to survive. This pattern is driven by socio-economic status and gender. A full 59% of poorer respondents said they would not be able to survive, while 20% of richer segments said the same (see **Figure 35B**).

Figure 34




Figure 35A





Figure 35B



Over 75% of respondents in all countries said that their family would provide financial support to them if their income is disrupted – with the exception of Iraq (68%) and Lebanon (71%). Almost no respondents said the government could help (under 2%) and very few said that they would not need financial support (under 4%). Local religious institutions are not seen on average as a viable source of support, with the highest percentages in Jordan (8%), Egypt (7%), and Palestine (7%).

When asked whom respondents would turn to in the event of an emergency or safety concern, 41% indicated their community. Another 22% said they would go to local authorities, 10% mentioned religious institutions, and 22% cited none of the above. Noticeable differences emerge between countries: respondents in Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen are less likely to seek support from their community, with only a third in each saying so, compared to over 50% in Algeria, Somalia and Syria. In Morocco, 37% cited local authorities, compared to only 11% mentioning the government. Conversely, in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Somalia, people are more likely to seek help from the government than from local authorities.

The Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018) seems to confirm this observed trend with respondents in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine trusting the national government more than the local government, while the reverse is true in the other countries surveyed. Egypt shows the widest gap between trust in national and local government, with 66% saying they trust the national government a great deal or quite a lot, and only 46% saying the same about the local government. Poor respondents were also less likely to say they would rely on local authorities (16% versus 24% among the rich). There are no differences among socio-economic classes when it came to reliance on community, government, and religious institutions.

A question about how respondents self-identify provides clues into what “community” means to them. Some forty percent identify most closely with their Arab culture, while 13% mentioned country of origin. Feelings of Arab-ness are strongest in Syria (87%), Jordan (51%), and Yemen (51%), and it was the top answer in all countries except for Morocco, where “Maghreb” was picked by a third of respondents, and Somalia, where 42% identify as African.

As already mentioned in **Citizenship 360° - Socio-economic exclusion**, food security emerges as the top priority among various public service areas such as health, education, clean water, and electricity. This is true in almost all countries, both crisis and middle-income, including Yemen (41%), Tunisia (39%), Lebanon (31%), Syria (30%), Egypt (29%), Palestine (27%), and Jordan (25%).

When asked whether access to food has changed over the last 10 years, a full 49% of the sample said that it has worsened. Majorities of the sample in Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen reported this to be the case. Fifty-three percent of the poorest segment said that access to food has worsened, compared to 34% of the richest segment. Over 50% in all countries blamed the lack of financial resources and increase in prices for the deterioration in food security, including over 80% in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, and Tunisia.

Citizenship 360° - Unaccountable governance

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
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Government Responsiveness

Thirty-one percent of respondents believe that the national government is not responsive to the needs of citizens, while 34% believe it is responsive and 35% neither agree nor disagree. Respondents in Jordan and Somalia were most likely to agree that governments are responsive, with close to 50% agreement in each country, followed by those in Egypt, at around 40%. Yet respondents in Somalia were also most likely

to disagree with this statement, along with respondents in Yemen, at about 45% and 55%, respectively. On average, richer respondents thought government was more responsive than poorer respondents by a margin of 10 percentage points and, by a similar margin, rural respondents were also more likely than urban respondents to find government responsive. Men and women share similar assessments.

Figure 36



A plurality of respondents believe that government responsiveness has stayed the same (38%); 30% said it has worsened in the last 10 years, while 22% said it has improved. Jordan and Morocco stand out as having the highest shares of respondents seeing improvement, at 37% and 32% respectively. Meanwhile, conflict areas like Libya, Syria, and Yemen describe the most drastically worsening levels. Men and women have equal assessments of changes in government responsiveness in the last 10 years, as do respondents living


in different locations. However, opinion diverges along socio-economic lines: richer segments of the sample were more likely to perceive improvement, and poorer respondents were more likely to perceive worsening over the last 10 years (see Figure 36).

Attitudes and patterns of assessment about local government responsiveness resemble those outlined above on national government responsiveness.

Half of the sample feel that they have no input at all into what the government does (see **Figure 37**). Majorities in Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen hold this view, with the highest percentages in Yemen (70%) and Morocco

(58%). A majority of poor respondents (54%) believe they have no input, as compared to 41% for richer respondents; women (58%) were more likely to hold this opinion than men (47%).

Figure 37



Over 65% of the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018) respondents in all countries covered both by our survey and the Arab Barometer⁶ rated the government’s performance in creating job opportunities as “*bad*” or “*very bad*”, with particularly high shares of “*very bad*” in Iraq (67%), Jordan (59%), and Lebanon (59%). Majorities in all countries were also critical of government performance in narrowing the gap between rich and poor and in keeping prices down. Except in Egypt and Morocco, over 50% of respondents also think the government is

failing to establish an appropriate environment for investment. In contrast to economic issues, majorities in all countries except for Lebanon and Libya deemed the government’s performance on providing security and order as “*very good*” or “*good*”. There are no significant differences across gender. Poorer respondents (those who face significant difficulties in covering their expenses) were more likely to negatively assess government performance on economic issues than were richer respondents (those who are able to save).

Corruption

In response to the question, *In the last 12 months, have you, or some of your acquaintances, made an informal payment or bribe to any government or public service?*, 59% reported that they have never found themselves in this position, with Algeria, Jordan, Palestine, and Somalia all reporting percentages of 70% or more. However, in several countries, majorities or near-majorities said they or someone they know has made an informal payment or bribe in the past year, notably in Libya (60%), Iraq (55%), Yemen (45%), and Egypt (44%).

Among the 34% who stated that they or some of their acquaintances have paid a bribe in the last 12 months, over 50% did so because they were explicitly asked to pay, while 28% said they knew a payment was expected and another 16% said they did so to help expedite or improve the process. Only 4% acted out of customary gratitude. The share of explicitly requested payments was highest in Iraq (36%) and Yemen (33%), while most of the respondents in Syria who paid a bribe did so in the hope of getting things done quicker or better.

⁶ Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Yemen.

Poor people were more likely to report not having made any payment than richer people (by a margin of 9%). There appears to be no divergence across socio-economic lines with respect to payments that were explicitly demanded. However, richer respondents were slightly more likely to have paid because it was expected (11% compared to 7%) or because it would help to get things done quicker or better (9% to 5%).

As mentioned in the section **Citizenship 360° - Socio-economic exclusion**, corruption is also seen as the root cause of many socio-economic woes plaguing countries. Forty-three percent of those who believe that inequality has increased

– a total of 2,553 respondents – as well as 43% of those who believe that employment opportunities have worsened – a total of 4,119 respondents – blamed an increase in corruption for the deterioration of circumstances. Although corruption was not listed as an option in other questions asking about the main reason for worsening conditions, many open-text answers from respondents mentioned corruption, including as a reason for worsening health services, worsening education, and increased poverty (see **Table 1**). Corruption in the hiring process is also the second-most cited employment issue after lack of job opportunities, with particularly high percentages in Algeria (43%), Iraq (38%), and Morocco (35%).

Table 1: Example of open-text answers respondents provided that mention corruption

What do you think is another main reason for increased poverty?	What do you think is another main reason for worsening health services?	What do you think is another reason for worsening education?
<i>"A deteriorating national economy with corruption"</i>	<i>"Because of the corruption of the state and the failure to give priority to the health sector"</i>	<i>"Administrative and financial corruption"</i>
<i>"Corruption and bureaucracy"</i>	<i>"Financial and administrative corruption"</i>	<i>"Corruption and neglect of officials"</i>
<i>"Corruption and functional monopoly"</i>	<i>"High cost, corruption and waste"</i>	<i>"Corruption of the Ministry of Education"</i>
<i>"Corruption and indifference to human rights"</i>	<i>"The greed of doctors and rampant corruption in medical institutions"</i>	<i>"Demonstrations and administrative corruption"</i>
<i>"Corruption and mismanagement of state resources"</i>	<i>"Armed conflicts and political corruption"</i>	<i>"Frequent corruption and the employment of unqualified professors"</i>
<i>"Corruption in all sectors of the state"</i>	<i>"Corruption of health officials"</i>	<i>"Lack of competencies and financial corruption"</i>
<i>"Corruption, bribery, cronyism, neglect of education and health"</i>	<i>"Administrative corruption"</i>	<i>"State administration's lack of interest in improving education"</i>
<i>"Corruption, low wages and high taxes"</i>	<i>"Corruption due to ruling parties"</i>	<i>"The introduction of corruption in the educational system to drain money"</i>
<i>"Increase and rampant corruption"</i>	<i>"Corruption of the Ministry of Health"</i>	<i>"There is no qualified cadre and also the spread of fraud and corruption"</i>
<i>"Prevalence of financial corruption and mediation"</i>	<i>"Indifference and corruption of some doctors"</i>	<i>"The corrupt system of education"</i>

In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), corruption is deemed pervasive, with over 70% of respondents in all countries surveyed saying that it exists to a large or medium extent within national state agencies and institutions. It is lowest in Morocco (69%) and highest in Iraq (93%), followed by Libya (92%) and Tunisia (90%). Countries have more divergent views on the efforts of their respective governments to crack down on corruption: in Egypt, 36% think the national government is working to a large extent towards that objective, while only 7% in Iraq and Lebanon feel the same. Corruption is thought to be less widespread at the local level, with majorities in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen claiming that no one or only a few officials at local or municipal levels of government are involved in corruption.

Trust in national government is highest in Egypt, where 27% reported a *“great deal of trust”* and another 39% *“quite a lot of trust”*. This is followed by Yemen, where those two answers made up 57% of all responses. Trust in local government is also relatively high in both countries, at 46% and 60% respectively. The Arab Barometer findings in Yemen contrast sharply with those of our survey, where respondents in Yemen were among the most pessimistic on governance issues. By contrast, in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Tunisia, less than a fifth of respondents in the Arab Barometer said they trust the government, but respondents in those four countries did demonstrate more trust towards local government, by a margin of approximately 10 percentage points. Finally, trust in the civil service/public administration is once again highest in Egypt (54% expressing great or some trust), followed by Jordan (50%). It is lowest in Lebanon (22%), Libya (26%), and Iraq (27%).

Crime and Violence

About 22% of the sample reported having needed help from the police in the last 12 months. This pattern is consistent for most countries, with Yemen (29%) having the highest percentage and Somalia (10%) the lowest. This need is equally shared across genders and socio-economic classes. Only 37% reported being satisfied with police services, with wide variation across countries. 60% in Jordan claimed they were satisfied or very satisfied, as did a similar share in Somalia. A significant majority of 60% reported being dissatisfied; such levels of dissatisfaction are more likely to occur in crisis countries and among the poor. In Libya and Yemen, 78% of respondents reported being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. In most countries, fewer than 5% of respondents said they were not able to receive help from the police but there were some exceptions: in Lebanon, the share is up to 14%, followed by Yemen (8%) and Egypt (7%). Meanwhile, 33% of the lowest income bracket said they were very dissatisfied, compared to only 18% of the top group, while 7% could not get support at all, compared to only 2% of the richest.

36% of respondents believe police support has stayed the same over the last 10 years, with 27% saying it has improved and another 27% saying police support has worsened in the last decade.

But the averages conceal different country realities: over 40% in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Somalia feel things have improved, while in conflict countries Libya, Syria, and Yemen, over 60% reported worsening support. Assessments are correlated with income, with richer respondents more likely to say that support has improved.


In the Arab Barometer Wave 5 (2018), respondents were asked how easy it is to get help from the police when they need it. Although the question is formulated differently from our survey, the results overlap somewhat with our findings: police services are very difficult or difficult to get in Libya (47%) and Lebanon (42%). On the other hand, in Jordan, 44% said it is very easy to get help, with another 30% saying it is easy. Compared to the trust in other institutions and actors, trust in the police is overall higher: over 50% in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen have great trust or some trust in the police, with particularly high figures in Jordan, where 67% said they have great trust.

The lowest levels of trust are found in Lebanon and Libya. Similarly, trust in the army is among the highest, with majorities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia saying they have great trust.

Forty-four percent of the sample said that violence and crime and the deterioration of justice have worsened in the last 10 years. Over 70% of respondents in Libya, Syria, and Yemen hold this view, as do 52% of Tunisians. Nineteen percent of the sample believe that violence and crime have decreased, and

justice has improved, with the highest shares in Algeria (34%) and Somalia (42%). Poorer respondents, compared to richer ones, were less likely to share that opinion, (21% to 33% - see **Figure 38**). Women, similarly, were much less likely to say there has been improvement (14% to 24%).

Figure 38



The 2,950 respondents who claimed violence has increased were asked about one or multiple sources of rising violence. The top response is increasing levels of corruption (61%), echoing our findings in the previous section on **Corruption**. This is followed by political strife within the country or region (57%), increasing poverty (52%), geopolitical uncertainty (28%), and ideological or religious extremism (24%). These opinions are stable across genders and class groups. Differences among countries can be detected; for example, 71% of respondents in

Jordan and Morocco cited poverty and lack of employment opportunities as the main triggers of violence, followed by corruption. In Somalia, 46% blamed extremism for deterioration of justice and increasing violence, the second-highest response after corruption. In Lebanon, a higher percentage (36%) also mentioned extremism, albeit as a fourth source of violence, after corruption, political strife, and poverty. In contrast, only 4% of the respondents in Algeria selected extremism.

International Cooperation

A non-negligible fraction of respondents did not know how to answer the questions on international cooperation: close to a quarter did not know to what extent their country cooperates with other countries, and close to a fifth did not know with which entity their country should cooperate more closely. Most of those who were unable to answer said no reliable information is available, including 74% of respondents in Tunisia and Yemen. Jordan has the highest percentage of respondents (close to 40%) stating that these issues do not concern them. Thirty-two percent of respondents thought the extent of cooperation with other countries is the right

amount; another 25% feel it is too little, and 19% too much. Most respondents (32%) support greater cooperation with international organizations, ahead of cooperation with friendly countries (22%) and regional organisations (14%). The Maghreb countries are most the most supportive of cooperation with friendly countries – 29% in Algeria, 30% in Morocco, and 26% in Tunisia. Crisis countries expressed greater desire for cooperation with international organizations: Somalia (44%), Syria (40%), and Yemen (36%).



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